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NOTES 
AVOIDING DOUBLE RECOVERY:  
ASSESSING LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN 
PRIVATE WAGE AND HOUR ACTIONS UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AND 
THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW 
Alexander J. Callen* 
 
Wage and hour cases are common in New York, yet courts calculate 
damages inconsistently when plaintiffs pursue their unpaid wages under 
both federal and state law.  Overlapping provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act and the New York Labor Law both authorize private actions 
for the recovery of certain unpaid wages, and each also provides an 
additional 100 percent of the unpaid wages as liquidated damages unless 
the employer establishes a good-faith defense.  Given these similarities, 
New York wage and hour cases regularly flirt with the double recovery 
doctrine, which prevents plaintiffs from receiving duplicative awards. 
Historically, courts in the Second Circuit have been split over whether 
awarding both sets of liquidated damages offends double recovery.  An old 
New York statute authorized only 25 percent of the unpaid wages as 
liquidated damages and allowed them only if an employee could 
demonstrate that the employer’s violation was willful.  Based upon the old 
law’s scienter requirement and upon its legislative history, courts 
considered the state provision punitive in purpose, as opposed to the 
federal provision, which is compensatory.  Consequently, some courts 
reasoned that because each provision served a different purpose, the 
awards were not duplicative.  Others disagreed. 
Although the New York Labor Law’s current liquidated damages 
provision bears little resemblance to its predecessor, some courts continue 
to apply analyses of the old statute to the new one.  This Note analyzes the 
effects that amendments enacted in 2009 and 2010 should have upon the 
preexisting split and contends that neither the current statutory text nor its 
legislative history conclusively supports characterizing the state provision 
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exclusively as either compensatory or punitive.  Instead, the evidence 
suggests a dual purpose.  Since the awards overlap, courts can only avoid 
double recovery by awarding one set of liquidated damages. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Between 1999 and 2007, the Saigon Grill in New York City employed 
thirty-six Chinese immigrants as delivery workers.1  None spoke English 
fluently, and none had received more than a “rudimentary” education in 
China.2  They routinely worked thirteen-hour shifts, often without meal 
breaks, for as little as $1.60 an hour.3  Thanks to federal and state wage and 
hour laws, their lawsuit resulted in a multimillion dollar award for back pay 
and damages.4 
The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 19385 (FLSA) authorizes 
employees to file private actions to recover unpaid minimum wages and 
overtime compensation, plus an additional sum equaling 100 percent of 
those underpaid wages6 as mandatory liquidated damages.7  An employer 
may avoid liability for liquidated damages only upon demonstrating that it 
acted in “good faith” and had “reasonable grounds” for believing that its 
behavior did not violate the FLSA.8  Currently, the New York Labor Law’s 
(NYLL) relevant provisions parallel the FLSA’s.9 
 
 1. Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 245, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 2. Id. at 248. 
 3. See id. at 249–51; ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:  VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN 
AMERICA’S CITIES 8 (2009), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/Broken
LawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1; Chuck Bennett, It’s the Fall of ‘Saigon’:  Eatery Staff Wins 
$4M in ‘Viet’ War, N.Y. POST (Oct. 22, 2008, 4:08 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/
regional/item_0T02j6LsKBE6KITzyyTUsO. 
 4. See Saigon Grill, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 267–81; BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 8; 
Bennett, supra note 3. 
 5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 6. Although both statutes define “wage,” see 29 U.S.C. § 203(m); N.Y. LAB. LAW 
§§ 190(1), 651(7) (McKinney Supp. 2013), this Note uses the term colloquially to reference 
an employee’s compensation for labor or services.  This Note employs more specific terms, 
such as “minimum wage,” “overtime compensation,” or “regular rate,” in accordance with 
statutory definitions, indicated as appropriate, infra. 
 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (authorizing private actions and specifying the recovery 
available); see also id. § 206 (establishing a federal minimum wage); id. § 207(a)(1) 
(limiting workweek unless employee receives “one and one-half times the regular rate at 
which he is employed” for hours exceeding forty). 
 8. See id. § 260; 29 C.F.R. § 790.16, .22; see also Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. 
Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir. 1999), modified, Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003); Reich v. 
S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); 1 THE FAIR LABOR 
STANDARDS ACT 1-20 to -21 (Ellen C. Kearns ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter KEARNS]; 2 id. 
at 18-163. 
 9. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 198(1-a), 663(1) (authorizing private actions for 
recovery of certain unpaid wages and overtime compensation, plus an additional 100 percent 
of those underpaid wages as mandatory liquidated damages unless an employer establishes a 
good-faith defense); see also id. § 652 (providing for the state minimum wage); N.Y. COMP. 
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.1 (2012) (same); id. § 142-2.2 (providing for overtime 
compensation “at a wage rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate in the 
manner [of the FLSA]”).  Article 6 of the NYLL (sections 190 to 199-D) is the state’s Wage 
Payment Act, while article 19 (sections 650 to 665) is the state’s Minimum Wage Act.  
Whether article 6 or article 19 applies depends upon the facts of a particular case. See Myers 
v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 368 (2011).  The 
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Such conformity, however, did not always exist.  An old New York 
statute enacted in 1967 (1967 Version) authorized employees to recover 
their unpaid wages, plus an additional 25 percent of those wages as 
liquidated damages if they could demonstrate that their employer’s violation 
was willful.10  Divergent interpretations of that statute created a split within 
the Second Circuit over whether liquidated damages could be awarded 
under both the federal and state statutes for the same underpaid wage or 
whether such an award would constitute an impermissible double recovery.  
Some courts reasoned that double recovery was avoided because the two 
liquidated damages provisions served different purposes—the FLSA’s 
compensatory and the NYLL’s punitive—while others reasoned that only a 
single award was appropriate because each provision remedied the same 
harm or served the same practical purpose.11 
In 2009, an amendment (2009 Amendment) removed the willfulness 
requirement.12  In 2010, another amendment (2010 Amendment) increased 
the amount of liquidated damages from 25 percent of the unpaid wages to 
100 percent.13  Despite the statutory overhaul, district courts in the Second 
Circuit have not seriously reassessed their positions, and some continue 
applying interpretations of the 1967 Version to the new statutory text.14  
Consequently, questions remain as to whether a plaintiff may recover 
liquidated damages under both statutes for the same underpaid wage.  The 
answer depends on whether courts will construe the current statute, based 
upon its text and legislative history, as exclusively compensatory or 
 
NYLL’s statutory remedies, including attorney’s fees and liquidated damages, exceed the 
damages available for common law breach of contract claims. See Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. 
Laub & Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 34 (N.Y. 1993).  The statutory awards require substantive 
statutory violations and are not recoverable for common law breach of contract claims. See 
id. at 32–34.  Because these two articles contain comparable liquidated damages provisions, 
for convenience this Note discusses only article 6’s hereafter. Compare N.Y. LAB. LAW 
§ 198(1-a), with id. § 663(1). 
 10. See Act of Apr. 18, 1967, ch. 310, § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1014, 1014. 
 11. Compare, e.g., Wicaksono v. XYZ 48 Corp., No. 10 Civ. 3635, 2011 WL 2022644, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011) (surveying the split and awarding both FLSA and NYLL 
liquidated damages on same underlying wage according to a “different purposes” theory), 
and Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Since the 
two awards serve different purposes, plaintiffs may recover both.”), with Greathouse v. JHS 
Sec., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7845, 2012 WL 3871523, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012) (surveying 
split and awarding liquidated damages under the statute providing the greater recovery, 
because both remedies address the same harm), and Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-
CV-5788, 2012 WL 3878113, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012), report and recommendation 
adopted, 2012 WL 3877963 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (awarding liquidated damages under 
the statute providing the greater recovery, because both remedies serve the same practical 
purpose). 
 12. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086. 
 13. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446. 
 14. See, e.g., Garcia v. Giorgio’s Brick Oven & Wine Bar, No. 11 Civ. 4689, 2012 WL 
3339220, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (relying on cases interpreting the 1967 Version 
for a “different purposes” analysis applied to the current statutory text), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3893537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); Angamarca v. Pita 
Grill 7 Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7777, 2012 WL 3578781, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012) (same). 
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punitive in purpose.  If left unaddressed, this issue threatens to perpetuate a 
practice of inconsistent awards in wage and hour cases. 
Consistency in wage and hour cases is increasingly important, because 
headline-grabbing cases like Saigon Grill15 form only the tip of the iceberg 
when it comes to the scourge of wage and hour violations plaguing New 
York and the nation.  America’s low-wage workers regularly suffer 
minimum wage and overtime compensation violations.16  In 2008, the 
National Employment Law Project (NELP) surveyed 4,387 workers in low-
wage industries in major American cities, including Chicago, Los Angeles, 
and New York.17  The survey revealed that 26 percent of respondents were 
paid less than the required minimum wage.18  Further, 25 percent of 
respondents reported working overtime, 76 percent of whom were paid less 
than the required overtime rate.19  Moreover, the average overtime worker 
accumulated eleven hours of overtime per week that were “either underpaid 
or not paid at all.”20  New York City’s figures parallel the national data.21 
The harms of wage and hour violations extend far beyond those inflicted 
upon individual workers—they also ripple throughout the economy.22  
Wage underpayment deprives communities of business- and job-sustaining 
spending, limits economic development, reduces tax revenues, and burdens 
social safety nets.23  It creates unfair competition for honest employers and 
drives down other workers’ wages.24  Wage and hour violations also impact 
 
 15. See Saigon Grill, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 240; Bennett, supra note 3. 
 16. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
 17. See id. at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2, 21. 
 20. Id. at 2, 22. 
 21. A 2008 NELP survey of 1,432 low-wage workers in New York City indicated that 
21 percent of respondents were paid less than the minimum wage; 36 percent of respondents 
worked overtime, 77 percent of whom were paid less than the required overtime rate; and the 
average overtime worker accumulated thirteen hours of unpaid or underpaid overtime per 
week. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKING WITHOUT 
LAWS:  A SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 2, 18 
(2010), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/990687e422dcf919d3_h6m6bf6ki.pdf; see also 
Annette Bernhardt, Wages Belong to the Workers, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Nov. 24, 2010, at 
A11, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 37 (discussing NELP’s New York City 
survey). 
 22. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 50. 
 23. See id.; see also Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act of 1997, ch. 605, § 1, 1997 N.Y. 
Laws 3392, 3392–93 (“Low-wage workers who are unpaid or underpaid cannot support 
themselves and their families, and may be forced to rely on scarce public resources.”). 
 24. See BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 50; see also Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act of 
1997, § 1 (describing the impact violations have on New York’s economy).  Some 
businesses even attempt to substitute “unpaid interns” for paid employees. See Steven 
Greenhouse, Jobs Few, Grads Flock to Unpaid Internships, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, at A1 
(describing the market for postgraduate unpaid internships); Jeffrey W. Rubin & Michael 
Berkowitz, Risky Business:  Using Unpaid Interns, 146 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) I-1 (2012) 
(outlining the ways that employers can structure unpaid internships to reduce the risks of 
wage and hour litigation); Steven Greenhouse, The Uses and Misuses of Unpaid Internships, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/the-
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the legal community.  Since 2008, the number of federal wage and hour 
cases has exploded, increasing by approximately 30 percent nationally.25  
Wage and hour cases now represent one of the “fastest growing areas of 
litigation,” and “mill” specialist firms have emerged across the country.26 
The trend shows no signs of easing, due to an unbalanced labor market 
exacerbated by the recent economic downturn.27  Although job losses were 
widespread during the recession, they hit mid-wage occupations the hardest 
and pushed many workers into low-wage positions.28  Post-recession job 
growth has concentrated on low-wage occupations, growing 2.7 times faster 
than mid-wage and high-wage positions.29  Compounding these effects, 
low-wage jobs account for “eight out of the top 10 occupations projected to 
grow the most by 2018.”30 
This Note analyzes the effects that the 2009 and 2010 Amendments 
should have upon the preexisting split over whether a plaintiff may recover 
both federal and state liquidated damages for the same underpaid wage.  
Part I introduces the FLSA and NYLL’s relevant provisions; key concepts 
 
uses-and-misuses-of-unpaid-internships/?ref=stevengreenhouse (chronicling the 
“considerable dismay” with certain postgraduate unpaid internships). 
 25. See Mitchell Hartman, More Overtime Hours, Less Overtime Pay?, MARKETPLACE 
(July 12, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/wealth-poverty/more-overtime-hours-
less-overtime-pay. 
 26. See Christopher M. Pardo, The Cost of Doing Business:  Mitigating Increasing 
Recession Wage and Hour Risks While Promoting Economic Recovery, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 
1, 10–13 (2010) (explaining the various reasons for the increased frequency of wage and 
hour litigation); see also Simona Covel, Businesses Face Threat of Lawsuits from Laid-Off 
Employees, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/independentstreet/
2009/02/18/businesses-face-threat-of-lawsuits-from-laid-off-employees/; Alexander Eichler, 
Unpaid Overtime:  Wage and Hour Lawsuits Have Skyrocketed in the Last Decade, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/
wage-hour-lawsuits_n_1556484.html; Martha Graybow, Tough Times Spur Laid-Off 
Workers To Sue, REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2008, 9:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/news
One/idUSN0640986220081111; Sally Roberts, Time Is Big Bucks, Class-Action Wage 
Lawsuits Show, WORKFORCE (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.workforce.com/article/20071221/
NEWS01/312219994. 
 27. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, THE LOW-WAGE RECOVERY AND GROWING 
INEQUALITY 1 (2012), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Job_Creation/LowWage
Recovery2012.pdf?nocdn=1; Catherine Rampell, Majority of Jobs Added in the Recovery 
Pay Low Wages, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at B1. 
 28. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1.  Low-wage occupations 
constituted 21 percent of job losses, mid-wage 60 percent, and high-wage 19 percent. See id.; 
see also Rampell, supra note 27 (discussing studies about the “polarization” of skills and 
wages).  NELP defines “lower-wage occupations” as those with median hourly wages of 
$7.69 to $13.83, “mid-wage occupations” as $13.84 to $21.13, and “higher-wage 
occupations” as $21.14 to $54.55. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 2. 
 29. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, supra note 27, at 1.  Low-wage occupations 
constituted 58 percent of job growth, mid-wage 22 percent, and high-wage 20 percent. See 
id.; see also Rampell, supra note 27. 
 30. Bernhardt, supra note 21, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 37 
(describing these occupations as “home care and child care workers, dishwashers, food 
prep[aration] workers, construction workers, cashiers, laundry workers, garment workers, 
security guards and janitors”); see also Letter from Nat’l Emp’t Law Project to Governor 
David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 56. 
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including double recovery, statutory multiple damages, and principles of 
New York statutory construction; and finally the leading judicial 
interpretations of the FLSA and NYLL’s liquidated damages provisions’ 
respective purposes.  Part II presents the preexisting split within the Second 
Circuit concerning awards made under the FLSA and the 1967 Version and 
discusses the effects of and purposes for the 2009 and 2010 Amendments.  
Finally, Part III argues that plaintiffs should be limited to one liquidated 
damages award to avoid double recovery because the current NYLL 
liquidated damages provision is both compensatory and punitive in purpose, 
thus overlapping with the FLSA. 
I.  BASIC ELEMENTS:  THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, THE NEW YORK 
LABOR LAW, AND DOUBLE RECOVERY 
This part begins with an introduction to the relevant FLSA and NYLL 
liquidated damages provisions before proceeding to a general discussion of 
related legal concepts, including the double recovery doctrine, the 
respective purposes of compensatory and punitive damages, the various 
roles that statutory multiple damages play, and the basic tenets of New 
York statutory construction.  This part concludes with the leading judicial 
interpretations characterizing the FLSA’s liquidated damages as 
compensatory and the 1967 Version’s as punitive. 
A.  Relevant Statutory Provisions 
The FLSA and NYLL have a lot in common.  This section sketches the 
basic framework of each statute’s liquidated damages provisions. 
1.  The Fair Labor Standards Act 
The FLSA is a comprehensive federal statute governing a wide array of 
employment matters.31  Among its most basic provisions are 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206, establishing the federal minimum wage, and § 207, requiring 
overtime compensation at 150 percent of an employee’s regular rate.32  
Such measures are intended to protect vulnerable low-wage workers from 
economic distress while promoting their health and general well-being.33 
 
 31. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 32. See id. §§ 206, 207(a)(1).  An employee’s “regular rate” should not be confused with 
the “minimum wage” rate. Compare id. § 206 (specifying the minimum wage rate), with id. 
§ 207(e) (defining “regular rate” for purposes of overtime compensation calculations). 
 33. See id. § 202(a) (declaring Congress’s intent to protect the “minimum standard of 
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers”); see also United 
States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 361 (1945) (observing Congress’s intent to protect 
workers “from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low to buy the bare necessities 
of life and from long hours of work injurious to health”); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s message 
emphasizing the FLSA’s provision of “[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” and of 
protections from the “evil” of “overwork” and “underpay”); United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (citing Congress’s concern over the “maintenance of the minimum 
standards of living necessary for health and general well-being” of workers). 
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Section 216(b) authorizes private actions to safeguard the FLSA’s 
reforms.34  In such actions, employers that have violated § 206 or § 207 
“shall be liable” not only for unpaid wages but also “an additional equal 
amount as liquidated damages” (i.e., 100 percent liquidated damages).35  
These liquidated damages are automatic and do not require an employee to 
demonstrate that an employer’s violation arose willfully or due to any other 
culpable state of mind.36 
Until 1947, liquidated damages awards were mandatory in all successful 
actions brought under § 216(b).37  At that time, Congress, reacting to early 
U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting § 216, enacted the Portal-to-Portal 
Pay Act38 (PPA), which provided employers with opportunities to avoid 
liquidated damages in certain situations.39  First, the PPA allowed for the 
compromise of claims “if there exists a bona fide dispute as to the amount 
payable,” as well as for the waiver of liquidated damages.40  Next, the PPA 
set a two-year statute of limitations for FLSA claims, since none had 
existed previously.41  Finally, the PPA gave courts broad discretion to 
reduce or deny liquidated damages where an employer demonstrates that it 
 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (authorizing private actions under § 216(b) and official actions 
under § 216(c) for violations of § 206 or § 207). 
 35. Id. § 216(b)–(c); see also 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-160.  Section 216(b) 
provides, in part: 
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this 
title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their 
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may 
be, and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . .  An action to 
recover the liability prescribed . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by 
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated. 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 36. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 37. See 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-160; see also Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., 
No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2003). 
 38. Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 251–262). 
 39. See id.  One of those early cases was Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 
(1945), in which a bank, realizing it had improperly compensated an employee’s overtime, 
subsequently paid the employee in full and obtained a release from the employee’s FLSA 
claims. See id. at 700.  Notwithstanding the release, the employee sued to recover FLSA 
liquidated damages. See id.  The Court held that an overriding public interest inherent in the 
FLSA prohibited employees from relinquishing their rights to liquidated damages, so such a 
waiver was “absolutely void.” See id. at 713–14; see also 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-18; 2 
id. at 18-160. 
 40. See § 3(a)–(b), 61 Stat. at 86; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-20.  Compromised claims 
may not yield sums less than statutory minimum wage and overtime compensation rates 
require. See 29 U.S.C. § 253; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-20; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–
207. 
 41. The PPA enacted a two-year statute of limitations. See § 6(a), 61 Stat. at 87–88; 
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 131–32 (1988); 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 
1-21.  A 1966 amendment extended the PPA’s limitations period to three years if a claim 
arose from a “willful” violation. See Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, tit. VI, 
§ 601(b), 80 Stat. 830, 844 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 255); McLaughlin, 486 U.S. 
at 131–32; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-21. 
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acted in “good faith” and had “reasonable grounds” for believing that its 
behavior did not violate the FLSA.42  Establishing the good-faith defense 
requires demonstrating affirmative steps taken to ascertain and comply with 
the FLSA.43  Thus, ignorance and negligence are inadequate defenses.44  
The employer’s burden is “difficult” to meet and must be met by “plain and 
substantial evidence.”45  Consequently, “[d]ouble damages are the norm, 
single damages the exception.”46 
2.  The New York Labor Law 
Like the FLSA, the NYLL governs a wide array of employment matters.  
Many of its provisions parallel the FLSA’s, such as those establishing a 
minimum wage47 and requiring overtime compensation at 150 percent of an 
employee’s regular rate.48  Further, section 198(1-a) authorizes private 
enforcement actions, in which an underpaid employee shall recover unpaid 
wages plus an “additional amount as liquidated damages equal to one 
hundred percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due.”49  
Finally, an employer can avoid the NYLL’s automatic liquidated damages 
upon proving a good-faith basis for believing that the underpayment 
complied with the law.50  Only recently, however, has such great 
conformity between the two liquidated damages provisions arisen. 
The relevant evolution of section 198 dates back at least to 1921, when 
New York passed a comprehensive set of labor laws, some of which 
 
 42. See § 11, 61 Stat. at 89; 29 C.F.R. § 790.16, .22; see also Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health 
& Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 150 (2d Cir. 2008); Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 
F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999), modified, Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 
2003); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); 1 KEARNS, 
supra note 8, at 1-21; 2 id. at 18-163.  Section 260 provides, in part: 
In any action . . . to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime 
compensation, or liquidated damages . . . if the employer shows to the satisfaction 
of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith 
and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a 
violation . . . the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages 
or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of 
this title. 
29 U.S.C. § 260. 
 43. See Barfield, 537 F.3d at 150–51 (citing Herman, 172 F.3d at 142 and Reich, 121 
F.3d at 71). 
 44. See Reich, 121 F.3d at 71 (“‘Good faith’ . . . requires more than ignorance of the 
prevailing law or uncertainty about its development.  It requires that an employer first take 
active steps to ascertain the dictates of the FLSA and then move to comply with them.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (alteration in original). 
 47. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 206, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 652 (McKinney Supp. 2013), and 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.1 (2012). 
 48. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 207, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 160, and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.2. 
 49. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a); see also supra note 9 
and accompanying text. 
 50. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a). 
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governed the payment of wages.51  Article 6, entitled “Payment of Wages,” 
provided for a fifty dollar civil penalty, payable to the state, for the failure 
of a “corporation or joint-stock association” to pay its employees’ wages.52  
Subsequently, the legislature enacted a series of amendments, which 
gradually broadened the provision’s scope to a wider variety of employers 
and employees.53 
Acts passed in 1966 and 1967, however, marked dramatic departures 
from the simple fifty-dollar civil penalty traditionally paid into state 
coffers.54  In 1966, the New York State Department of Labor (NYDOL) 
sponsored the recodification of article 6.55  The language governing the 
fifty-dollar civil penalty was moved from section 198 to section 197, which 
retained the heading “Civil penalty,”56 and the new section 198, labeled 
“Costs, remedies,” provided that a prevailing employee “may” recover “in 
addition to ordinary costs, a reasonable sum, not exceeding fifty dollars for 
expenses which may be taxed as costs.”57  One year later, New York added 
section 198(1-a), which required employers to pay employees who 
prevailed in court an additional 25 percent of unpaid wages as “liquidated 
damages” for “willful” violations of the state’s wage and hour laws.58 
The 1967 Version’s language remained unchanged for decades until 
2009, when New York eliminated the willfulness requirement and replaced 
it with a presumption that liquidated damages are available unless the 
employer establishes a good-faith defense.59  Shortly after enacting the 
2009 Amendment, New York passed the 2010 Amendment as part of the 
 
 51. Act of Mar. 9, 1921, ch. 50, §§ 195–198, 1921 N.Y. Laws 132, 165–66. 
 52. Id. § 198, 1921 N.Y. Laws at 166.  Section 198 of the 1921 statute provided: 
If a corporation or joint-stock association, its lessee or other person carrying on the 
business thereof, shall fail to pay the wages of all its employees, as provided in this 
article, it shall forfeit to the people of the state the sum of fifty dollars for each 
such failure, to be recovered by the commissioner in a civil action. 
Id. 
 53. See Act of June 14, 1965, ch. 354, § 1, 1965 N.Y. Laws 1111, 1111–12 (expanding 
to include employers who “differentiate in rate of pay because of sex”); Act of Apr. 14, 
1944, ch. 793, § 1, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1755, 1756 (expanding to include employers who 
“discriminate in rate of pay”); Act of May 21, 1934, ch. 745, § 1, 1934 N.Y. Laws 1520, 
1520–21 (expanding to include violations by “person[s]” or “copartnership[s]”). 
 54. Act of Apr. 18, 1967, ch. 310, § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1014, 1014; Act of June 14, 
1966, ch. 548, § 2, 1966 N.Y. Laws 1293, 1298. 
 55. See 1966 N.Y. Laws at 1293 n.*; Memorandum from Indus. Comm’r (June 3, 1966), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1966, ch. 548, at 4–5; see also Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub & 
Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 31–32 (N.Y. 1993). 
 56. § 2, 1966 N.Y. Laws at 1298. 
 57. Id.  
 58. § 1, 1967 N.Y. Laws at 1014.  The 1967 amendment created section 198(1-a), which 
provided: 
In any action instituted upon a wage claim by an employee or the commissioner in 
which the employee prevails, the court shall allow such employee reasonable 
attorney’s fees and, upon a finding that the employer’s failure to pay the wage 
required by this article was willful, an additional amount as liquidated damages 
equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due. 
Id. 
 59. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086. 
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Wage Theft Prevention Act of 201060 (WTPA).61  The WTPA increased 
penalties for certain violations of the state’s labor laws, and it required 
employers to provide employees with certain notifications related to their 
work and pay.62  The WTPA also amended section 198(1-a) by increasing 
the amount of liquidated damages recoverable in a private action from 25 
percent of unpaid wages to 100 percent.63 
B.  Double Recovery and Damages 
After explaining the double recovery doctrine, this section discusses 
compensatory and punitive damages, which are two types of damages 
available at law.  Understanding the role that each category plays is 
essential when determining the nature or purpose of a statutory multiple 
damages provision, as described toward the end of this subsection. 
1.  Double Recovery 
The potential for double recovery inevitably arises in New York wage 
and hour cases when plaintiffs allege violations of both the FLSA and 
NYLL.  The FLSA has a two-year statute of limitations that expands to 
three years for willful violations.64  The NYLL, on the other hand, has a 
six-year statute of limitations, regardless of willfulness.65  When a 
prevailing plaintiff claims both federal and state damages arising from back 
pay accrued during the overlapping two- to three-year period, courts must 
determine whether to award damages under the federal statute, the state 
statute, or both. 
As the Supreme Court has declared, “courts can and should preclude 
double recovery.”66  The double recovery doctrine restricts a plaintiff to a 
single recovery for a single injury, even if the plaintiff pleads and tries 
multiple or alternative legal theories of recovery.67  Thus, if a federal claim 
 
 60. ch. 564, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446. 
 61. See id. § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws at 1450. 
 62. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 
429–30 (addressing the controversy over WTPA’s notice requirements). See generally 2010 
N.Y. Laws at 1446–58. 
 63. See § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws at 1450. 
 64. See 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 65. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(3) (McKinney Supp. 2013). 
 66. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the 
Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980)); see also Phelan v. Local 305 of the United 
Ass’n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A plaintiff may not recover 
twice for the same injury.”); Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642, 
649 (2d Cir. 1989); Barrington v. New York, 806 F. Supp. 2d 730, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“‘It 
has been broadly stated that judicial policy forestalls a double recovery for an injury.’” 
(quoting Zarcone v. Perry, 434 N.Y.S.2d 437, 443 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1980))); 1 DAN B. 
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1, at 2–3 (2d ed. 1993). 
 67. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1389 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “double recovery” as a 
“judgment that erroneously awards damages twice for the same loss, based on two different 
theories of recovery”); see also Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1459–60 (10th 
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by TW Telecom Holdings Inc. v. Carolina Internet 
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and a state claim arise from the same injury and seek the same relief, 
damages awarded under both theories would constitute a double recovery.68  
In the absence of punitive damages, a plaintiff can recover no more than the 
loss actually suffered, because a larger award would produce a windfall.69  
That said, compensatory awards for multiple injuries stemming from a 
single act or omission do not offend double recovery, provided they do not 
encompass duplicative elements or exceed the aggregate harm caused.70 
To illustrate, both the FLSA and NYLL provide for the full recovery of 
unpaid overtime compensation.71  Although these statutes overlap, courts 
will not permit plaintiffs to recover those wages twice, because doing so 
would award a windfall.72 
The doctrine’s application, however, is less straightforward where 
liquidated damages are involved.  In addition to the underlying wage, both 
the FLSA and NYLL provide for multiple damages as liquidated 
damages.73  Whether prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to both sets of 
liquidated damages depends upon whether each is considered compensatory 
or punitive in nature.74  Compensatory and punitive damages perform 
different functions, but are typically awarded together.75  Since awards 
serving different functions are not duplicative, their combination does not 
offend double recovery.76 
 
Ltd., 661 F.3d 495 (10th Cir. 2011); Phelan, 973 F.2d at 1063; Ostano Commerzanstalt, 880 
F.2d at 649. 
 68. See 2 ROBERT S. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK:  CIVIL § 79:3, at 502 (2012). 
 69. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 1389 (defining “double recovery” 
as a “[r]ecovery by a party of more than the maximum recoverable loss that the party has 
sustained”); id. at 1738 (defining “windfall” as “[a]n unanticipated benefit, usu. in the form 
of a profit and not caused by the recipient”); see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 1.1, at 4 
(describing punitive damages as “noncompensatory” damages).  For a discussion of “actual 
damages,” see infra Part I.B.2. 
 70. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 658 (1915) 
(“Although originating in the same wrongful act or neglect . . . [a decedent’s pain and 
suffering and a beneficiary’s pecuniary losses] are quite distinct . . . .  One begins where the 
other ends, and a recovery upon both in the same action is not a double recovery for a single 
wrong, but a single recovery for a double wrong.”); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 1.1, at 3 (“[A] 
plaintiff can have more than one remedy so long as the total does not provide more than one 
complete compensation or one complete restitution.”). 
 71. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney Supp. 2013); see 
also Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 556 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting 
that the NYLL mandates overtime pay in the same manner as the FLSA); Reiseck v. 
Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2010) (same). 
 72. See, e.g., Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 262 n.44 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); see also Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-CV-5788, 2012 WL 3878113, at *7 
(E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3877963 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-148 (observing that “courts have 
consistently held that the recovery of the same compensatory damages under both the 
[FLSA] and a state regime is impermissible”). 
 73. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a). 
 74. For a discussion of the split within the Second Circuit on this issue, see infra Part II. 
 75. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); see also 
Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001). 
 76. See Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642, 649 (2d Cir. 
1989); see also Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999) 
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2.  Compensatory Damages, Prejudgment Interest, and Liquidated Damages 
Compensatory damages redress the actual losses a plaintiff has 
suffered.77  They are intended to make the plaintiff whole again, restoring 
the position that would have been occupied had an injury never occurred.78  
Compensatory damages are limited to the amount a plaintiff actually lost, 
because a plaintiff should not receive a windfall or profit from an injury.79 
Prejudgment interest is a type of compensatory damage, because it is an 
equitable award that compensates plaintiffs for the lost use of money during 
a period preceding the entry of judgment.80  It represents part of a plaintiff’s 
actual damages and is designed to make the plaintiff whole.81  In federal 
actions, prejudgment interest awards are typically discretionary.82  Usually, 
 
(awarding both state liquidated damages and state prejudgment interest on the same 
underpaid wage, because each award serves a different purpose); Phelan v. Local 305 of the 
United Ass’n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (“When a plaintiff 
receives a payment from one source for an injury, defendants are entitled to a credit of that 
amount against any judgment obtained by the plaintiff as long as both payments represent 
common damages”); 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-148 to -149 (“[S]everal courts have held 
that an employer is subject to both state and federal remedial measures that the court finds 
are not duplicative.”). 
 77. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (defining “actual damages” as 
“[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages 
that repay actual losses” and as “compensatory damages”); see also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 
416; Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 432; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977). 
 78. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (defining “compensatory 
damages” as “[d]amages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss 
suffered” and as “actual damages”); see also Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416. 
 79. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 118 (2012). 
 80. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 715 (1945) (“[I]nterest is 
customarily allowed as compensation for delay in payment.”); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 
840 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1988) (permitting prejudgment interest in the absence of FLSA 
liquidated damages); Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Pre-
judgment interest obviously serves the compensatory purpose by making up for the delay in 
receiving the money, during which time the employees were denied its use, and by partially 
offsetting the reduction in the value of the delayed wages caused by inflation.”); see also 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(b) (McKinney 2007) (specifying that prejudgment interest should be 
calculated “from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed” or when damage 
was incurred); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.6(1)–(2), at 333, 346 (discussing various 
potential starting points for prejudgment interest calculations). 
 81. See Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988); see also, e.g., 
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175 (1989) (“[P]rejudgment interest 
traditionally has been considered part of the compensation due plaintiff.”); Loeffler v. Frank, 
486 U.S. 549, 558 (1988); West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310–11 (1987); 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655–56 (1983). 
 82. Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858, 873 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Endico Potatoes, 
Inc. v. CIT Grp./Factoring, Inc., 67 F.3d 1063, 1071–72 (2d Cir. 1995).  Courts exercising 
such discretion weigh numerous factors, such as “(i) the need to fully compensate the 
wronged party for actual damages suffered, (ii) considerations of fairness and the relative 
equities of the award, (iii) the remedial purpose of the statute involved, and/or (iv) such other 
general principles as are deemed relevant by the court.” Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of 
Am., 223 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (considering four factors enumerated in SEC v. First 
Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1476 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also SEC v. Milligan, 436 F. 
App’x 1, 3 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming a district court’s application of the First Jersey 
Securities factors). 
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a pecuniary award will not fully compensate a plaintiff unless it includes an 
“interest component.”83  Therefore, when damages represent compensation 
for lost wages, “it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-
judgment interest” in some manner.84  Practically, prejudgment interest 
prevents employers from “enjoy[ing] an interest-free loan” at their 
employees’ expense and promotes settlements by discouraging defendants 
from delaying payments to injured plaintiffs.85  Despite these deterrent 
effects, prejudgment interest is not considered to be a punitive award or an 
additional penalty because the “essential rationale” for awarding 
prejudgment interest is ensuring that a plaintiff is fully compensated.86 
Finally, parties may stipulate to the recovery of “liquidated damages”—
predetermined or estimated amounts—in lieu of actual damages.87  
Liquidated damages help aggrieved parties avoid the difficulty, expense, 
and uncertainty of itemizing and proving damages in court.88 
 
 83. Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2001); see also, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. 
Cement Div., Nat’l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995); West Virginia, 479 U.S. at 310–
11; Devex, 461 U.S. at 655–56. But see Bd. of Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 352 
(1939) (“[I]nterest is not recovered according to a rigid theory of compensation for money 
withheld, but is given in response to considerations of fairness.  It is denied when its 
exaction would be inequitable.”). 
 84. Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873 (collecting cases and quoting Saulpaugh v. Monroe 
Cmty. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1993)); Donovan, 726 F.2d at 57–58 (“[I]t is 
ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment interest in a back-pay award 
under [§ 217 of] the FLSA.”); Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d 252, 264 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873–74), aff’d, 652 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 85. Gierlinger, 160 F.3d at 873–74 (quoting Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 145); Donovan, 726 
F.2d at 58 (“Failure to award interest would create an incentive to violate the FLSA, because 
violators in effect would enjoy an interest-free loan for as long as they could delay paying 
out back wages.”); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.6(1)–(2), at 333–34, 346. 
 86. See City of Milwaukee, 515 U.S. at 195 (“The essential rationale for awarding 
prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss.”); see 
also Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The purpose of a 
prejudgment interest award . . . is to compensate a plaintiff for the loss of use of money.” 
(quoting Chandler v. Bombardier Capital Inc., 44 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1994))); Donovan, 
726 F.2d at 57–58 (describing prejudgment interest’s compensatory purpose and its 
secondary deterrent effects); Lodges 743 & 1746, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. United 
Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 447 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[A]wards of prejudgment interest are 
essentially compensatory, and wrongdoing by a defendant is not a prerequisite to an award.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 87. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 445 (“[Liquidated damages are a]n 
amount . . . stipulated as a reasonable estimation of actual damages to be recovered . . . .  
[T]he sum fixed is the measure of damages . . . , whether it exceeds or falls short of the 
actual damages.”).  Of course, statutory multiple damages differ from traditional liquidated 
damages, because the parties do not specify them—the legislature sets them instead.  As the 
Second Circuit observed, the FLSA’s use of the phrase is “something of a misnomer.” Brock 
v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1063 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 88. See, e.g., N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-718 (McKinney 2002) (allowing certain contracting 
parties to set liquidated damages “at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the 
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the 
inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy.  A term fixing 
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.”); see also BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 446, 448 (distinguishing “general damages,” which 
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3.  Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages have a long history in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.89  Today, American courts consider punitive damages to be a 
category of damages distinct from compensatory damages.90  Courts 
regularly instruct juries on the twin goals of modern punitive awards:  
deterrence and retribution.91  Thus, a defendant’s culpability is an important 
factor, and courts typically limit punitive damages to cases of “enormity, 
where a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, 
willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others, or 
behavior even more deplorable.”92  Large punitive awards might be 
justified when wrongdoing is hard to detect or when an injury and its 
corresponding compensatory award are small.93  Thus, punitive damages 
 
frequently result from torts and “do not need to be specifically claimed,” from “special 
damages,” which must be “specifically claimed or proved”). 
 89. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 490–92 (2008) (surveying the 
evolution of punitive damages in the Anglo-American tradition). 
 90. See id. at 492 (citing Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851)). See 
generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 455 (“Punitive damages are sums awarded in 
addition to any compensatory or nominal damages.”); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES § 1.4(B), at 17 (6th ed. 2010) (“[I]t has been a well settled doctrine in [the United 
States] for over a century that punitive damages are non-compensatory in character.”). 
 91. For example, New York instructs juries:  “The purpose of punitive damages is not to 
compensate the plaintiff but to punish the defendant for [wanton, reckless, or malicious] acts 
and thereby to discourage the defendant and other[s] from acting in a similar way in the 
future.” 1B COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS’N OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE STATE OF N.Y., NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL § 2:278, at 830 
(3d ed. 2012); see also Baker, 554 U.S. at 492–93, 513; Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 
U.S. 346, 352 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) 
(“[P]unitive damages . . . are aimed at deterrence and retribution.”); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (stating that punitive damages are 
“intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991); 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275 (1989); City 
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1977); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 455 (“Punitive damages 
are sums awarded . . . , usually as punishment or deterrent.”); Cass R. Sunstein et al., 
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 
2071, 2081–82 (1998). 
 92. Baker, 554 U.S. at 493 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Day, 54 U.S. at 371; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 448 (defining “punitive damages” as “[d]amages awarded in 
addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit; 
specif., damages assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to 
others” and explaining that punitive damages are intended to punish and deter 
“blameworthy” conduct); 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 90, § 9.3(A), at 634–39. 
 93. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 494 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 and RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 
(1982) (“It is in the nature of punitive remedies to authorize awards that may be out of 
proportion to actual injury; such remedies typically are established to deter particular 
conduct, and the legislature not infrequently finds that harsh consequences must be visited 
upon those whose conduct it would deter.”). 
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serve broad societal purposes94 and may even function like criminal 
penalties.95 
4.  Statutory Multiple Damages 
Many statutes specify awards that double, triple, or multiply damages by 
some other factor.96  Such multiple damages can be compensatory or 
punitive in nature.97  The distinction between compensatory and punitive 
statutory damages is especially significant in New York, because a state 
procedural rule bars recovery of statutory penalties in class actions unless 
the statute imposing the penalty specifically authorizes class recovery.98 
Punitive statutory multiple damages differ from the common law punitive 
damages because statutes cap the maximum punitive award.99  The fixed 
limit may reduce the potential threat to a defendant and “the possibility of a 
measured deterrence.”100 
 
 94. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 491–92; Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. 
at 432; Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a 
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”); 
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (“[P]unitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution and 
deterrence.”); 1B NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2:278, at 838 (“Punitive 
damages claims are quintessentially and exclusively public in their ultimate orientation and 
purpose, even when prosecuted in the context of personal injury actions . . . .  [P]unitive 
damages have been held inapplicable to certain types of claims, . . . [absent] conduct aimed 
at the public.”). 
 95. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417; see also 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(1), at 457 
(explaining that punitive damages serve “as a means of securing public good through a kind 
of quasi-criminal punishment in the civil suit”).  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Campbell, the Court observed, “[a]lthough these awards serve the same purposes as 
criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been 
accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.” 538 U.S. at 417.  The Court 
used “three guideposts” to analyze the reasonableness of a $145 million punitive award 
accompanying only $1 million in compensatory damages, including:  “(1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or 
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the 
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id.; see also Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 424; 
Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.  The most important guidepost is “the degree of reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s conduct.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
 96. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 511–12 (collecting various statutes exemplifying multiple 
damages provisions); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 541–42 (same); see also BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 447 (defining “multiple damages” as “[s]tatutory 
damages (such as double or treble damages) that are a multiple of the amount that the fact-
finder determines to be owed”). 
 97. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543. 
 98. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (determining that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
901(b) does not preclude federal courts sitting in diversity from hearing class actions seeking 
state statutory penalties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23). 
 99. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 491 (distinguishing common law punitive damages as 
“untethered to strict numerical multipliers” of statutes); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 
543 n.17 (explaining that extrastatutory punitive awards are “largely discretionary”). 
 100. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543. 
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Statutory multiple damages can also serve “entirely non-punitive 
purposes.”101  Some provide liquidated damages for actual losses that are 
difficult to prove or otherwise unrecognized by the law.102  Others may 
induce private enforcement of matters of public importance, which might 
otherwise remain financially unattractive causes of action.103 
When it comes to characterizing the nature of statutory multiple 
damages, the presence of a “willfulness” or a similar scienter requirement is 
often a key distinction between punitive and compensatory provisions.104  
The word “willful,” although “widely used in the law,” lacks a clear 
definition and is “generally understood to refer to conduct that is not merely 
negligent.”105  As the U.S. Supreme Court recently observed, “scienter 
requirements are typical of punitive statutes, because [legislatures] often 
wish[] to punish only those who intentionally break the law.”106  Generally, 
multiple damages conditioned upon “serious wrongdoing” will appear 
punitive, and those providing a ‘liquidated’ award compensatory.107  The 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. (citing United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976) and Overnight Motor 
Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942)); see also supra Part I.B.2 (describing 
“liquidated damages”). 
 103. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 494–95, 511 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
344 (1979), which observes, “Congress created the treble-damages remedy of § 4 [of the 
Clayton Act] precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to antitrust 
violations” to “provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available” for 
official enforcement); 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 543–44 (citing Agency Holding 
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. 483 U.S. 143 (1987)). 
 104. See generally 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.11(2), at 468–75 (discussing the role a 
defendant’s culpable state of mind often plays in punitive statutes). 
 105. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 135 (1988) (interpreting 
“willful” as used in the FLSA’s statute of limitations as knowledge or reckless disregard); 
see also Walton v. United Consumers Club, 786 F.2d 303, 308–09 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“Wilfulness is a weasel word denoting a range of culpability from gross negligence to actual 
knowledge plus malice, depending on the context.  Usually it denotes some highly culpable 
mental state either actual knowledge that one’s acts violate the law or reckless indifference 
to the law.” (citation omitted)); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 67, at 1737 (“[Willful 
means v]oluntary and intentional, but not necessarily malicious.”); id. (“[Willfulness is] 1. 
The fact or quality of acting purposely or by design; deliberateness; intention.  Willfulness 
does not necessarily imply malice, but it involves more than just knowledge.  2. The 
voluntary, intentional violation or disregard of a known legal duty.”). 
 106. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595 (2012).  In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court differentiated between 
taxes and penalties, following the “functional approach” of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 
259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922). See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96.  “[T]hree practical 
characteristics” convinced the Bailey Court that a purported tax on child labor was actually a 
penalty:  (1) the burden imposed was “exceedingly heavy”; (2) only those who “knowingly” 
violated the law had to pay; and (3) enforcement was by the Department of Labor, “an 
agency responsible for punishing violations of labor laws, not collecting revenue.” Id. 
 107. 1 DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.12, at 544 (citing 15. U.S.C.A. § 117 and 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 216(a)); 1 SCHLUETER, supra note 90, § 2.1(B), at 25–28 (describing the important role 
culpability requirements play when identifying statutory multiple damages provisions as 
punitive or nonpunitive). 
 1898 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
absence of a willfulness or scienter requirement, however, will not 
necessarily disqualify a punitive characterization.108 
C.  Statutory Construction 
Issues of statutory construction lie at the heart of this Note.  After 
introducing relevant principles of New York statutory construction, this 
section examines leading decisions coloring the “purpose” or “nature” of 
the FLSA and of the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages provisions. 
1.  Principles of New York Statutory Construction 
In New York, legislative intent is the “great and controlling principle” in 
statutory construction,109 and statutory text is the primary source of 
legislative intent.110  The text of a multiple damages provision, however, 
might not unambiguously suggest either a compensatory or a punitive 
purpose.  When statutory text is unclear, courts may attempt to divine 
legislative intent from extrinsic sources, such as legislative history.111  Such 
sources can help courts determine how the legislature intended to “suppress 
the evil and advance the remedy” of a particular “mischief,”112 or further 
the general underlying “object, spirit and purpose of the statute.”113 
 
 108. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (finding that a 
multiple damages provision lacking a culpability requirement in the Jones Act was not 
“merely” or “exclusively” compensatory, since the legislature had also designed it “to 
prevent, by its coercive effect” delayed payments to seamen). 
 109. N.Y. Post Corp. v. Leibowitz, 143 N.E.2d 256, 260 (N.Y. 1957) (quoting People v. 
Ryan, 8 N.E.2d 313, 315 (N.Y. 1937)); see also N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 92, 191 (McKinney 
1971); Albany Law Sch. v. Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, 968 N.E.2d 
967, 974 (N.Y. 2012) (“In matters of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to 
discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intention.”).  
 110. See N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 76, 94 (“The legislative intent is to be ascertained from the 
words and language used, and the statutory language is generally construed according to its 
natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction.”); 
Albany Law Sch., 968 N.E.2d at 974 (“As we have repeatedly stated, the text of a provision 
‘is the clearest indicator of legislative intent and courts should construe unambiguous 
language to give effect to its plain meaning.’” (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 
860 N.E.2d 705, 708 (N.Y. 2006)); Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 883 N.E.2d 990, 993–94 
(N.Y. 2008); Dep’t of Welfare v. Siebel, 161 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 1959) (“Legislative intent is 
to be determined primarily from the language used in the act under consideration.”). 
 111. See N.Y. STAT. LAW §§ 76, 120–25, 191; Albany Law Sch., 968 N.E.2d at 974 
(“[W]e should inquire into the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires 
examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Young v. Town of Huntington, 388 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981–
82 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1976) (observing that courts may look to “legislative history, 
the circumstances surrounding the statute’s passage, the general spirit and purpose 
underlying the enactment, the recitals in the statute’s preamble, and the statements of the 
statute’s draftsmen” (citations omitted)); STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
LEGAL RESEARCH 8 (9th ed. 2009). 
 112. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 95. 
 113. Id. § 96. 
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Generally, legislative history is comprised of documents reflecting the 
information that lawmakers considered before enacting the legislation.114  
Although Congress generates vast amounts of legislative history, state 
legislative history is typically sparse.115  In New York, committee reports 
and debate records are rare; all the courts typically have to rely upon are 
governor’s bill jackets.116  Bill jackets cobble together assorted materials, 
which may include a sponsor’s memorandum, constituents’ letters 
concerning legislation awaiting the governor’s signature, or a governor’s 
statement approving or vetoing a bill—in other words, “[n]ot much of a 
window on legislative intent.”117 
Even when relevant materials are available, they deserve only “some 
weight in the absence of more definitive manifestations of legislative 
purpose” and “must be cautiously used.”118  A governor’s statements may 
be examined in an analysis of legislative intent, but such statements “suffer 
from the same infirmities” as those that legislators make during floor 
debates—namely that “it is impossible to determine with certainty” whether 
an individual’s views are attributable to an entire legislative body.119 
In many instances, extrinsic aids for determining state legislative intent 
do not exist at all.120  When federal laws are models for state laws, 
however, Congress’s intent and the history of the federal laws may inform 
interpretations of the state laws, since the state legislature presumably had 
the same objectives where it employed similar terminology.121  Uniform 
 
 114. See BARKAN, supra note 111, at xxxii–iii, 157 (defining “legislative history” as 
documents and other materials providing “background information and insight into the 
purpose and intent of statutes”); Legislative Intent, N.Y. ST. LIBR., http://www.nysl
.nysed.gov/legint.htm (last updated Jan. 16, 2013). 
 115. See BARKAN, supra note 111, at 207; Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do:  State 
Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. REV. 595, 600 (1997); Legislative Intent, supra note 
114. 
 116. See Kaye, supra note 115, at 600. 
 117. See id.; Legislative Intent, supra note 114. See generally ROBERT ALLAN CARTER, 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN NEW YORK STATE:  MATERIALS, CASES AND ANNOTATED 
BIBLIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2001) (surveying the research process for legislative intent in New 
York); William H. Manz, If It’s Out There:  Researching Legislative Intent in New York, 77 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 43 (2005) (same). 
 118. Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. Sch. Dist., 696 N.E.2d 978, 981–82 (N.Y. 
1998). 
 119. Id. at 982; see United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) 
(“[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the 
members of a legislative body that passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual 
members thereof.  Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those who did; and 
those who spoke might differ from each other.”); see also N.Y. STAT. LAW § 14 (McKinney 
1971) (“The Governor’s function in approving and disapproving bills submitted by the 
Legislature, as required by the [state’s] Constitution, is legislative in nature.”).  In Majewski 
v. Broadalbin-Perth Central School District, the New York Court of Appeals rejected a 
governor’s explicit statements that a statute should apply retroactively. See 696 N.E.2d at 
984. 
 120. See Legislative Intent, supra note 114. 
 121. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 262 (“In interpreting an ambiguous statute of New York, the 
court may consider the construction placed on a similar statute of another state or country by 
its courts.”); H.O.M.E.S. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (App. Div. 
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construction is desirable, and federal constructions of federal laws are 
highly persuasive, yet they are not binding on state courts interpreting state 
laws.122 
2.  Construing FLSA Liquidated Damages As Compensatory and the 
Unavailability of Prejudgment Interest 
Although 29 U.S.C. § 216 is entitled “Penalties,” within five years of the 
FLSA’s enactment, the Supreme Court ruled that the liquidated damages 
provision is compensatory in nature.123  In Overnight Motor Transportation 
Co. v. Missel,124 the Court rejected a due process challenge to § 216’s 
mandatory liquidated damages provision.125  The Court explained that 
regardless of an employer’s good faith or reasonableness, the liquidated 
damages provision neither violates due process nor warrants shifting the 
burden of proof to employees who are “no more at fault than the 
employer.”126  The Court distinguished § 216’s liquidated damages from 
the “threat of criminal proceedings,” “prohibitive fines,” and “double 
damages treated as penalties.”127  The Court also emphasized that § 216 
provides “compensation, not a penalty or punishment,” because wage 
underpayments “may well result in damages too obscure and difficult of 
proof for estimate other than by liquidated damages.”128 
A few years later, the Court reinforced Missel’s characterization of 
§ 216’s liquidated damages as compensatory.129  In Brooklyn Savings Bank 
v. O’Neil,130 the Court held that a plaintiff may not recover prejudgment 
 
4th Dep’t 1979) (“Since the State law was modeled after the Federal law in this respect, for 
construction of the State law we look to the cases which have construed the [federal law].”) 
(citations omitted); Young v. Town of Huntington, 388 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk 
County 1976); Sterling Factors Corp. v. Sad Sam’s Furnitureland of Binghamton, Inc., 195 
N.Y.S.2d 55, 58–59 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1960) (considering the legislative history of 
other states’ statutes, upon which a contested statute was modeled). 
 122. See In re Lazarus, 52 N.Y.S.2d 682, 687 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1944) (“While Federal 
statutes and decisions are not binding on us, they are highly persuasive and uniformity in 
interpretation is desirable.”), aff’d, 64 N.E.2d 169 (N.Y. 1945); Manhattan Storage & 
Warehouse Co. v. Movers & Warehousemen’s Ass’n of Greater N.Y., 28 N.Y.S.2d 594 
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1941), rev’d on other grounds, 43 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1942); People ex 
rel. Mosbacher v. Graves, 5 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1938) (“It is apparent 
that this state statute was copied verbatim from the federal, thus indicating a strong 
legislative intent for uniformity in interpretation.”), aff’d, 19 N.E.2d 89 (N.Y. 1939); Young, 
388 N.Y.S.2d at 978. 
 123. See 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006) (entitled “Penalties”); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1942) (determining that the FLSA’s liquidated damages are 
compensatory); see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945); Herman 
v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999), modified, Zheng v. Liberty 
Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 124. 316 U.S. 572 (1942). 
 125. See id. at 583. 
 126. Id. at 582–84. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id.; see also supra notes 87–88, 102, 107 and accompanying text. 
 129. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707–08, 715 (1945). 
 130. See id. 
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interest in addition to § 216 liquidated damages.131  The Court reiterated 
that an employee’s actual injuries may be “too obscure and difficult of 
proof for estimate”132 and added that § 216’s liquidated damages 
compensate employees “for delay in payment.”133  The Court emphasized 
Congress’s concerns for low-wage employees, who, “receiving less than the 
statutory minimum[,] are not likely to have sufficient resources to maintain 
their well-being and efficiency until such sums are paid.”134  Consequently, 
underpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation “may be so 
detrimental” to these vulnerable workers “that double payment must be 
made in the event of delay in order to insure restoration of the worker to 
that minimum standard of well-being.”135  The Court concluded that 
layering prejudgment interest upon liquidated damages would be 
“inconsistent with Congressional intent,” since Congress had already “seen 
fit to fix the sums recoverable for delay.”136  In sum, combining 
prejudgment interest with the FLSA’s liquidated damages would produce 
an impermissible double recovery.137 
In the wake of Brooklyn Savings Bank, Congress amended the FLSA, 
granting district courts discretion to reduce or deny liquidated damages 
where an employer demonstrates a reasonable, good-faith attempt to 
comply with the FLSA.138  As a result, some workers might not receive any 
 
 131. Id. at 714–16; 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-164. 
 132. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 707 (citing Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 
316 U.S. 572 (1942)). 
 133. Id. at 715 (noting that § 216(b) “authorizes the recovery of liquidated damages as 
compensation for delay in payment of sums due under the [FLSA]”); see also 2 KEARNS, 
supra note 8, at 18-164 (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. 697); Carrasco v. W. Vill. Ritz 
Corp., No. 11 Civ. 7843, 2012 WL 3822238, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (citing Reilly v. 
NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 134. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 708; see also Donovan v. Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 
F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The award of interest [in a § 217 case] is especially 
appropriate for wage earners, who ordinarily do not have access to resources other than their 
wages to meet the necessities of daily living.”). 
 135. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 707–08 (emphasis added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) 
(1940)); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 136. Brooklyn Sav. Bank, 324 U.S. at 715.  
 137. See id. at 715–16 (“To allow an employee to recover the basic statutory wage and 
liquidated damages, with interest, would have the effect of giving an employee double 
compensation for damages arising from delay in the payment of the basic minimum 
wages.”); see also supra Part I.B.1.  As a corollary, prejudgment interest is available in 
§ 217 actions, where liquidated damages are not authorized. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216 
(2006), with id. § 217.  In Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., the Second Circuit upheld the 
Secretary of Labor’s entitlement to collect unpaid overtime wages on behalf of employees, 
but disallowed liquidated damages because § 217 does not authorize them. Brock v. Superior 
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1064–65 (2d Cir. 1988).  On motion for clarification, the court 
permitted an award of prejudgment interest, because “[o]nce we have disallowed liquidated 
damages [in a § 217 action], there is no reason to deny the Secretary the opportunity to 
collect prejudgment interest, which is normally awarded in FLSA suits in the absence of 
liquidated damages.” Id. at 1064; see also Donovan, 726 F.2d at 57–58 (awarding 
prejudgment interest in a § 217 action). 
 138. See Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 251–262) (providing the good-faith defense codified at 29 U.S.C. § 260); Trans 
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liquidated damages as compensation for delay.  The availability of a good-
faith defense, however, has not deterred the Second Circuit from following 
Brooklyn Savings Bank’s characterization of § 216’s liquidated damages as 
compensatory, rather than punitive.139  As the court asserted, “[t]he 
possibility that a judge may in narrow circumstances relieve an employer of 
its obligation to pay alters neither Section 216’s general command that 
liquidated damages be paid nor our repeated recognition that these 
damages count as compensation.”140 
3.  Construing NYLL Liquidated Damages As Punitive and the Availability 
of Prejudgment Interest 
The punitive nature of NYLL liquidated damages derives from Carter v. 
Frito-Lay, Inc.141  In a two-page opinion, the New York Appellate 
Division, First Department, concluded that New York’s Civil Procedure 
Law and Rule 901(b) prohibits class recovery of liquidated damages under 
the 1967 Version, because such damages constitute a “penalty.”142  The 
court provided two reasons for rejecting arguments that the 1967 Version’s 
liquidated damages constituted purely additional compensation.143  First, 
the court relied on the 1967 Version’s text, observing that recovery is 
“expressly conditioned on a finding of willful conduct on the part of the 
employer.”144  Second, the court cited the statute’s legislative history, 
specifically characterizing a memorandum that Governor Nelson A. 
Rockefeller issued upon signing the 1967 Version into law as “pointedly 
refer[ing]” to a deterrent and retributive scheme.145  The court quoted the 
memorandum, stating that the provision is a “stronger sanction against an 
employer for willful failure to pay wages . . . [and] should result in greater 
compliance with the law.”146  The court concluded, “It is clear that 
liquidated damages as provided in this statute, and especially as viewed in 
 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985); see also supra notes 39–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 139. See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 260 (2d Cir. 2010) (“As we have said 
with regard to FLSA’s liquidated damages provision in the past, ‘[l]iquidated damages are 
not a penalty exacted by the law, but rather compensation to the employee occasioned by the 
delay in receiving wages due caused by the employer’s violation of the FLSA.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1999))), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1000 (2011); Reich v. S. New Eng. Telecomms. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 
71 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 140. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d at 260 (emphasis added). 
 141. 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980), aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 
1981). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id.  Here, the court’s reasoning parallels the Supreme Court’s in Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 411 U.S. 111 (1985), where the Court relied upon a willfulness 
requirement to distinguish a “punitive” liquidated damages provision from the FLSA’s 
compensatory provision. Id. at 125–28.  For a discussion of Thurston, see infra Part II.B. 
 145. Carter, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 116. 
 146. See id. (alterations in original) (quoting Administration Memorandum, reprinted in 
1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184). 
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this context, constitute a penalty.”147  In a two-sentence opinion, the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision “for reasons stated in the 
memorandum at the Appellate Division.”148 
The New York Court of Appeals separately discussed the legislative 
history of the 1967 Version in Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub & Co.,149 where 
the court held that section 198(1-a) does not apply to a common law breach 
of contract claim.150  Based on materials in the bill jacket, Gottlieb 
concluded that supporters of the 1967 Version treated all of the remedies in 
section 198 as “addressing the same problem (i.e., employers’ violation of 
the wage laws), having the same objective (enhancing enforcement of the 
Labor Law’s substantive wage enforcement provisions), and providing 
cumulative remedies for wage claims brought thereunder.”151  The court 
cited NYDOL’s supporting memorandum, which, according to the court, 
frames the bill’s “sole” purpose as “[t]o assist the enforcement of the wage 
payment and minimum wage payment laws by imposing greater sanctions 
on employers for violation of those laws.”152  The court also cited a 
memorandum from the state AFL-CIO, which characterizes section    
198(1-a)’s provisions for attorney’s fees and liquidated damages 
collectively as “one more safeguard to assure employees of proper payment 
of wages under the law and would thus be a deterrent against abuses and 
violations.”153 
Carter laid the foundation for the Second Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. 
NatWest Markets Group Inc.,154 which held that an employee may recover 
state prejudgment interest in addition to the 1967 Version’s liquidated 
damages for the same underlying wage.155  NatWest had argued that 
Reilly’s state liquidated damages award should obviate additional state 
prejudgment interest.156  NatWest’s position relied upon In re CIS Corp.,157 
in which a bankruptcy court declined to award prejudgment interest because 
NYLL liquidated damages “are in the nature of compensation for the lost 
use of wages . . . [and] are the functional equivalent of pre-judgment 
interest.  [Awarding both] would provide [the plaintiff] redress twice for the 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Carter v. Frito-Lay Inc., 419 N.E.2d 1079, 1079 (N.Y. 1981). 
 149. 626 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1993). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at 33. 
 152. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Memorandum from Indus. Comm’r (Apr. 5 1967), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 4). 
 153. Id. (second emphasis added) (quoting Memorandum from N.Y. State AFL-CIO, 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 11). 
 154. 181 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 155. See id. at 265; see also, e.g., Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-CV-5788, 2012 
WL 3878113, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012) (following Reilly’s approach to prejudgment 
interest), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3877963 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012).  
Reilly does not mention Gottlieb at all. See Mark Walfish & Adrienne B. Koch, Awarding 
Attorneys’ Fees and Liquidated Damages, 223 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2000) (“No reference to Gottlieb 
is contained in the [Reilly] court’s opinion.”). 
 156. Reilly, 181 F.3d at 265. 
 157. 206 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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same loss.”158  However, the Reilly court found the bankruptcy court’s 
reasoning “unpersuasive.”159  Because of Carter’s determination that 
“liquidated damages under [section 198(1-a)] ‘constitute a penalty’ to deter 
an employer’s willful withholding of wages,” the Second Circuit concluded 
that the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages were exclusively punitive in 
nature.160  The court permitted Reilly to recover both state liquidated 
damages and state prejudgment interest, because the awards “serve 
fundamentally different purposes” and are not “functional equivalents.”161 
II.  THE QUAGMIRE:  THE UNDERLYING INTRACIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE 
CONFLICTING SIGNALS THE 2009 AND 2010 AMENDMENTS SEND 
Although Reilly addressed the intersection of state prejudgment interest 
and state liquidated damages, that decision came to serve as the basis for an 
intracircuit split over whether plaintiffs may, under the 1967 Version, 
recover both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages upon the same unpaid 
wages (i.e., 125 percent liquidated damages).  Courts awarding recovery 
under both statutes reasoned that each liquidated damages provision served 
a different purpose, so no double recovery occurred.162  Other courts 
adopted the position that the FLSA and NYLL’s liquidated damages 
provisions remedied the same harms or accomplished the same practical 
purposes, so awarding both would offend double recovery.163 
Before the Second Circuit addressed the split, the state legislature 
amended section 198(1-a) twice.164  In light of these amendments, a new 
analysis is necessary to guide courts facing demands for both state and 
federal liquidated damages on the same underlying wage.  Reilly was 
decided a decade before these amendments drastically changed the statute’s 
text.  The Second Circuit and the New York Court of Appeals have 
 
 158. Id. at 690; Reilly, 181 F.3d at 265. 
 159. Reilly,181 F.3d at 265. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.; see also Janus v. Regalis Constr., Inc., No. 11-CV-5788, 2012 WL 3878113, at 
*8 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3877963 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012); Maldonado v. La Nueva Rampa, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8195, 2012 WL 
1669341, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012); supra Part I.B.2 (discussing prejudgment 
interest’s compensatory nature). 
 162. See, e.g., Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., No. 09-CV-5018, 2012 WL 4369754, at *9 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012) (“[T]he two statutory provisions serve different purposes and are 
therefore not mutually exclusive.”); Santillan v. Henao, 822 F. Supp. 2d 284, 297 (E.D.N.Y 
2011) (“Because each award serves fundamentally different purposes, plaintiff may be 
granted both awards.”); Wicaksono v. XYZ 48 Corp., No. 10 Civ. 3635, 2011 WL 2022644, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011); Yu G. Ke v. Saigon Grill, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 240, 261–62 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 163. See, e.g., Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7845, 2012 WL 3871523, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); Janus, 2012 WL 3878113, at *8; Drozd v. Vlaval Constr., Inc., 
No. 09 CV 5122, 2011 WL 9192036, at *15 n.19 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4815639 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2012). 
 164. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450–
51; Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086. 
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acknowledged the amendments, but neither has interpreted them.165  Of 
course, a judicial determination of legislative purpose is a prerequisite to 
the “different purposes” analysis.  As discussed in this part, only a handful 
of district courts have recognized the need for fresh analysis.  Others 
continue to apply interpretations of the 1967 Version to the amended 
text.166 
This part begins by supplementing the discussions in Carter and Gottlieb 
regarding the 1967 Version’s legislative history.167  Then, it presents the 
changes that the 2009 and 2010 Amendments’ wrought upon section 198(1-
a) and provides evidence of the state legislature’s motivations for enacting 
those amendments. 
A.  Revisiting the 1967 Version’s Legislative History 
Nothing in Reilly suggests that the Second Circuit independently 
examined the legislative history underlying Carter’s decision.  In fact, the 
very same governor’s memorandum upon which Carter relies explicitly 
asserts that the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages would “compensate the 
employee for the loss of the use of the money to which he was entitled.”168  
Carter omits this language from its quotation, although it is in the 
memorandum’s next sentence.169 
Governor Rockefeller’s memorandum echoed statements other interested 
parties expressed before the 1967 Version became law—statements which 
the Carter and Gottlieb analyses both omit.170  Such statements are 
memorialized in the 1967 Version’s bill jacket, which contains not only the 
governor’s memorandum but also numerous other submissions.171  For 
example, the sponsor’s memorandum explains that liquidated damages 
 
 165. See Kuebel v. Black & Decker, Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 366 n.9 (2d Cir. 2011); Ryan v. 
Kellogg Partners Institutional Servs., 968 N.E.2d 947, 952 n.8 (N.Y. 2012). 
 166. See, e.g., Garcia v. Giorgio’s Brick Oven & Wine Bar, No. 11 Civ. 4689, 2012 WL 
3339220, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2012) (relying on cases interpreting the 1967 Version 
to support a “different purposes” analysis applied to the current statutory text), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3893537 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012); Angamarca v. Pita 
Grill 7 Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7777, 2012 WL 3578781, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012) (same). 
 167. For discussions of Carter and Gottlieb, see supra Part I.C.3. 
 168. Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Apr. 18, 1967), reprinted in 
N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14. 
 169. Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980) (quoting 
Administration Memorandum, reprinted in 1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184), aff’d, 419 
N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981); see also Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller 
(Apr. 18, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14. 
 170. See N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310.  For discussions of Carter and Gottlieb, see 
supra Part I.C.3. 
 171. The relevant bill jacket contains a more comprehensive collection of materials than 
the 1967 New York State Legislative Annual, which Carter cites. Compare N.Y. Bill Jacket 
1967, ch. 310, with 1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184; see also Carter, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 116 
(citing 1967 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 184, but not the bill jacket). 
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would serve both punitive and compensatory purposes.172  First, as 
“stronger sanctions,” they would result in “greater compliance with the 
law.”173  Second, they would “compensate the employee for the loss of the 
use of the money to which he was entitled.”174  Similarly, the Division of 
Budget observed that liquidated damages would both “improve 
compliance” and “repay workers for a good deal of anguish, time and 
money.”175  Furthermore, NYDOL, the agency responsible for enforcing 
the NYLL, also commented on the provision’s dual purposes.176  NYDOL’s 
memorandum justified liquidated damages as both a way to “impos[e] 
greater sanctions” against violators and a way to compensate underpaid 
workers while avoiding complicated back pay calculations.177 
B.  The Importance of “Willfulness” or Similar Scienter Requirements 
In addition to legislative history, Carter rests upon the 1967 Version’s 
text—namely its explicit inclusion of a “willfulness” requirement.178  The 
2009 Amendment eliminated that requirement.179  Now, the NYLL, like the 
FLSA, presumes liquidated damages are available unless an employer can 
establish a good-faith defense.180  The following discussion explores the 
roles scienter requirements played in three U.S. Supreme Court opinions 
interpreting analogous statutory multiple damages provisions. 
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,181 the Supreme Court 
addressed whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s182 
 
 172. See Letter from Assemblyman Frank A. Carroll to Robert R. Douglass, Counsel to 
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Mar. 31, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 
310, at 2–3. 
 173. Id. at 3; Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Apr. 18, 1967), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14. 
 174. Letter from Assemblyman Frank A. Carroll to Robert R. Douglass, Counsel to 
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Mar. 31, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 
310, at 3; Memorandum from Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller (Apr. 18, 1967), reprinted in 
N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 14. 
 175. Budget Report on Bills (Apr. 6, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 
6. 
 176. See Memorandum from Indus. Comm’r (Apr. 5, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 
1967, ch. 310, at 4–5. 
 177. See id. (observing that the “bill follows the example of the Federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act in providing an easily-calculable formula for liquidated damages” and that 
liquidated damages will “also compensate the employee for the loss of the use of the 
money”).  Gottlieb’s discussion of NYDOL’s memorandum omits this language. See 
Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub & Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1993); see also supra note 152 
and accompanying text. 
 178. See Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980), 
aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981). 
 179. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, § 1, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086. 
 180. The FLSA’s defense provision also explicitly requires reasonableness, while the 
NYLL’s does not. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) 
(McKinney Supp. 2013).  As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook quipped, “[a] good heart but an 
empty head does not produce a defense” under § 260. Walton v. United Consumers Club, 
786 F.2d 303, 312 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 181. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
 182. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634). 
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(ADEA) inclusion of a willfulness requirement distinguished its liquidated 
damages provision from the FLSA’s.183  Congress passed the ADEA in 
1967 as an amendment to the FLSA.184  Section 7(b) of the ADEA was 
modeled on and explicitly incorporates the FLSA’s liquidated damages 
provision, but limits such awards to “cases of willful violations.”185  The 
Court, recognizing Congress’s familiarity with the FLSA’s provisions and 
with judicial interpretations of them, held that Congress intended the 
ADEA’s liquidated damages to be punitive in nature, because the 
willfulness proviso “significantly” distinguished the ADEA’s provision 
from the FLSA’s.186  Consequently, the ADEA’s liquidated damages are 
only available for violations when an employee demonstrates an employer’s 
knowledge of or reckless disregard for the law.187 
After Thurston, an intercircuit split arose over whether ADEA liquidated 
damages displaced prejudgment interest, or whether they were “strictly 
punitive” and prejudgment interest could supplement them.188  The Second 
Circuit, following Thurston’s characterization of the ADEA’s liquidated 
damages as punitive, reasoned that prejudgment interest and ADEA 
liquidated damages serve different purposes, so both can be recovered on 
the same wage claim.189 
Subsequently, in Commissioner v. Schleier,190 the Supreme Court 
reiterated the importance of the “willfulness” distinction between FLSA and 
 
 183. See Thurston, 469 U.S. at 111. 
 184. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 
602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634); see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 
507 U.S. 604, 614 (1993); Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125–26; 1 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 1-26. 
 185. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).  Section 7(b) provides that the ADEA “shall be enforced in 
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in . . . § 216 (except for 
subsection (a) thereof)” and that “[a]mounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of 
this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation 
for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title:  Provided, That liquidated damages shall 
be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.” Id.; see also Biggins, 507 U.S. 
at 606; Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 579 (1978)); 
Walton, 786 F.2d at 308. 
 186. Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125 (“Moreover, § [2]16(b) of the FLSA, which makes the 
award of liquidated damages mandatory, is significantly qualified in ADEA § 7(b) by a 
proviso that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to double damages ‘only in cases of willful 
violations.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b))). 
 187. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Thurston, 469 U.S. at 126.  The Court reaffirmed Thurston’s 
“willfulness” standard in McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988), which 
interpreted “willful” in the FLSA’s statute of limitations as consistent with the Thurston 
standard of knowledge or reckless disregard. Id. at 133; see also Biggins, 507 U.S. at 614–15 
(observing McLaughlin’s reaffirmation of Thurston). 
 188. See, e.g., Downey v. Comm’r, 33 F.3d 836, 839–40 (7th Cir. 1994) (surveying the 
split). 
 189. See Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F.2d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 
1987) (“[P]rejudgment interest does not provide a double recovery to victims of age 
discrimination who have proven their entitlement to liquidated damages as well as back 
pay.”); see also Chandler v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 44 F.3d 80, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(following Reichman). 
 190.  515 U.S. 323 (1995). 
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ADEA liquidated damages.191  In Schleier, the Court rejected Schleier’s 
argument that Congress intended “liquidated damages under the ADEA 
serve, at least in part, to compensate plaintiffs for personal injuries that are 
difficult to quantify” by incorporating the FLSA’s liquidated damages 
provision.192  The Court acknowledged that portions of the ADEA’s 
legislative history supported Schleier’s position.193  Nonetheless, the Court 
invoked precedent:  “We have already concluded that the liquidated 
damages provisions of the ADEA were a significant departure from those 
in the FLSA, and we explicitly held in Thurston:  ‘Congress intended for 
liquidated damages to be punitive in nature.’”194  The Court stressed the 
importance of the willfulness requirement, explaining that, “[i]f liquidated 
damages were designed to compensate ADEA victims, we see no reason 
why the employer’s knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct should 
be the determinative factor in the award of liquidated damages.”195 
On the other hand, the Court does not always condition a punitive 
characterization upon the inclusion of a willfulness or scienter requirement.  
In Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,196 a seaman sued his former 
employer for unpaid wages and penalties under the Jones Act, which the 
Court explained had authorized seamen who were not paid promptly upon 
discharge to recover “two days’ pay for each and every day” of delay in 
which a shipmaster or owner “refuses or neglects to make payment . . . 
without sufficient cause.”197  The district court, in its discretion, had 
reduced the time period in which Griffin’s overdue wages remained 
outstanding, ultimately calculating a penalty of $6,881.60.198  Griffin 
appealed, arguing that a literal application of the statute precluded such 
discretion and that he should have received over $300,000 because of the 
$412.50 in wages Oceanic had withheld.199  Oceanic responded that the 
statute served remedial and compensatory purposes, so the award Griffin 
sought was “so far in excess of any equitable remedy as to be punitive.”200  
Agreeing with Oceanic, the Court observed that it was “highly probable” 
that the damages Griffin sought would “greatly exceed[] any actual injury” 
 
 191. See id. at 326 (“[U]nlike the FLSA, the ADEA specifically provides that ‘liquidated 
damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter.’” (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 626(b) and Thurston, 469 U.S. at 125)). 
 192. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 331. 
 193. See id. at 331–32. 
 194. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  The Court observed that Thurston already 
had considered the legislative history pertaining to the liquidated damages’ compensatory 
effects but had not found it persuasive. See id. at 332 n.5. 
 195. Id. at 332 n.5.  The Court did not address the effect that the availability of a good-
faith defense has upon this logic. Cf. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 260 (2d Cir. 
2010) (explaining that the availability to employers of a good-faith defense which could 
deprive employees of liquidated damages does not affect the compensatory nature of FLSA 
liquidated damages); see also supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 196. 458 U.S. 564 (1982). 
 197. Id. at 570. 
 198. See id. at 568. 
 199. See id. at 568, 574–75. 
 200. Id. at 571. 
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the delayed payment had caused.201  Still, the Court ruled for Griffin, 
because the statutory awards were not “merely” or “exclusively” 
compensatory, but also punitive since Congress had designed the statute “to 
prevent, by its coercive effect, arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to induce 
prompt payment when payment is possible.”202 
Aside from eliminating the willfulness requirement, nothing in the text or 
legislative history of the 2009 or the 2010 Amendments suggests that the 
New York legislature intended to change the punitive gloss that courts, like 
Reilly, had assigned to section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages provision.  
Then again, nothing acknowledges that gloss in the first place.203  Rather, 
the 2009 Amendment was introduced at the request of NYDOL to “expand 
worker protections and remedies against employers who violate Labor Law 
requirements related to wage payment.”204  The bill raised section 215’s 
penalties, untouched since the 1960s, but the amount of liquidated damages 
available to employees under section 198(1-a) remained at 25 percent.205  
Instead, as the bill’s sponsor and NYDOL both explained, the bill shifted 
section 198(1-a)’s burden of proof to eliminate the “inherent unfairness” of 
requiring an employee to shoulder the “onerous burden” of demonstrating 
that an employer’s violation was willful to obtain liquidated damages.206  
The bill’s sponsor expected primarily low-wage workers “struggling to 
support their families on the minimum wage” to benefit from this 
change.207 
 
 201. Id. at 575. 
 202. Id. (quoting Collie v. Fergusson, 281 U.S. 52, 55–56 (1930)). 
 203. Nonetheless, legislators are presumably aware of existing judicial interpretations. 
See Schmidt v. Falls Dodge, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 399, 403 (N.Y. 2012) (Ciparick, J., dissenting) 
(observing that “the legislative history of a particular enactment must be reviewed in light of 
the existing decisional law which the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with” and that 
settled interpretations become “as much a part of the enactment as if incorporated into the 
language of the act itself” (quoting Matter of Knight-Ridder Broad., Inc. v. Greenberg, 511 
N.E.2d 1116, 1119 (N.Y. 1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 204. See Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor 
David A. Paterson (Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10. 
 205. See Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, §§ 1–2, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086–87; Letter 
from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David A. Paterson 
(Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10–11.  Floor debates in the 
state Assembly and Senate focused on the increased penalty provisions and availability of a 
good-faith defense for employers but reveal little about the issues this Note addresses. See 
N.Y. State Senate, Record of Proceedings 6547–51 (July 16, 2009) (Bill No. 6963) (remarks 
of Sen. Stephen M. Saland) (opposing the bill because statutory “penalties get increased 
rather dramatically without the benefit of the good-faith exception that’s recognized for 
purposes of the liquidated damages”); N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 268–71 
(June 22, 2009) (Bill No. 6963) (remarks of Assemb. Kenneth P. Zebrowski) (responding to 
Assemblyman James D. Conte’s questions about increased penalties and the good-faith 
defense). 
 206. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, 
at 6; Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David A. 
Paterson (Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10–11. 
 207. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, 
at 6. 
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C.  The NYLL’s Newfound Conformity with the FLSA 
In effect, the 2009 and 2010 Amendments conform the NYLL’s 
liquidated damages provision to the FLSA’s.  Together, the amendments 
eliminated section 198(1-a)’s willfulness requirement, provided employers 
with a good-faith defense, and increased liquidated damages from 25 
percent to 100 percent.208 
Since the amendments’ enactment, however, no court interpreting section 
198(1-a) has acknowledged a legislative intent to attain any degree of 
conformity with federal law.  Still, some courts have commented on the 
laws’ effective convergence as impacting the analysis underlying the 
intracircuit split.209  As Magistrate Judge James Orenstein remarked in 
dicta, “To the extent the federal and state statutes now provide for 
essentially identical remedies with respect to liquidated damages, it is 
harder to argue that they are designed to compensate a plaintiff for disparate 
harms.”210  Similarly, Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein has also 
observed that the federal and state provisions now address the same 
harms.211  Finally, Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck found the arguments 
favoring a single set of liquidated damages “even more compelling” now 
that the NYLL’s liquidated damages “mirror” the FLSA’s.212 
Although courts have not mentioned it, the legislative history does 
address the NYLL’s conformity with the FLSA.  In support of the 2009 
Amendment, the sponsor’s memorandum stated that the bill would 
 
 208. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260 (2006), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney 
Supp. 2013). 
 209. For a brief discussion of the split, see supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
 210. Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., No. 09-CV-5018, 2012 WL 4369754, at *9 n.11 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2012); Siemieniewicz v. CAZ Contracting Corp., No. 11-CV-0704, 
2012 WL 5183375, at *12 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2012), report and recommendation 
adopted as modified, 2012 WL 5183000 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2012). 
 211. See Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7845, 2012 WL 3871523 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 7, 2012) (awarding liquidated damages under only one statute because the federal and 
state awards address the same harms); Paz v. Piedra, No. 09 Civ. 03977, 2012 WL 121103, 
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2012) (same).  In both Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc. and Paz v. 
Piedra, Magistrate Judge Gorenstein cited Chun Jie Yin v. Kim, No. 07 CV 1236, 2008 WL 
906736 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008), as supporting the proposition that the federal and state 
statutes both address the same harms. See Greathouse, 2012 WL 3871523, at *7; Paz, 2012 
WL 121103 at *12.  In Kim, however, Magistrate Judge Orenstein had applied the 1967 
Version, under which New York still required willfulness. See Kim, 2008 WL 906736, at *4.  
Furthermore, Magistrate Judge Orenstein subsequently found error in his conclusion in Kim. 
See Siemieniewicz, 2012 WL 5183375, at *12 n.10.  In any event, both the NYLL and the 
FLSA now award liquidated damages unless an employer establishes the good-faith defense. 
Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a). 
 212. See Li Ping Fu v. Pop Art Int’l Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8562, 2011 WL 4552436, at *5 n.9 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2011).  Judge Denise L. Cote adopted Magistrate Judge Peck’s Report 
and Recommendation, as modified, on clear error review, because “courts in [the Second] 
Circuit are split as to whether a plaintiff may recover both federal and state liquidated 
damages for the same overtime violation.” Li Ping Fu v. Pop Art Int’l, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 
8562, 2011 WL 6092309, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).  As discussed in Part II.D, infra, 
Judge Cote’s own analysis of the 2010 Amendment’s legislative history in McLean v. 
Garage Management Corp., No. 10 Civ. 3950, 2012 WL 1358739, *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
19, 2012), suggests that she might reach a contrary conclusion. 
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“conform New York law to the Fair Labor Standards Act.”213  Similarly, 
NYDOL, the agency responsible for enforcement, submitted a 
memorandum reiterating the sponsor’s observation.214  The Legal Aid 
Society215 and NELP216 also submitted memoranda noting the state’s step 
toward conformity with the FLSA. 
In 2009, the state avoided full conformity with the FLSA.217  Whatever 
reservations may have existed in 2009, however, were overcome by 2010, 
when the WTPA increased liquidated damages from 25 percent to 100 
percent.218  This time, however, neither the bill’s sponsor, NYDOL, nor the 
governor mentioned conformity with the FLSA.219  Nevertheless, interested 
third parties noted the effect.  For example, the Legal Aid Society observed, 
“Damages owed, on top of wages, will be increased from 25% to 100%—
matching the damage level in twenty-four other States and under federal 
law.”220  Other parties making similar observations include Coalition for 
the Homeless,221 Jobs with Justice,222 and Make the Road.223 
D.  The Twin Goals of Deterrence and Retribution 
Before Governor Rockefeller signed the 1967 Version into law, 
constituents were already criticizing its weak enforcement scheme.  For 
 
 213. Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, 
at 6. 
 214. See Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor 
David A. Paterson (Aug. 4, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 10–11. 
 215. See Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David A. 
Paterson (Aug. 20, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 22 (“[The bill] 
brings State law into conformance with existing federal protections which allow recovery of 
liquidated damages in all cases of wage underpayment unless the employer can demonstrate 
a good-faith belief that his or her underpayment was legal.”). 
 216. Letter from Nat’l Emp’t Law Project to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David 
A. Paterson (Aug. 17, 2009), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 372, at 20 (“This 
proposal would take a first step toward making New York state law more consistent with 
federal law in awarding damages for minimum wage and overtime violations.”). 
 217. See Memorandum in Support of Legislation, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2009, ch. 
372, at 6 (“The bill would not impact the 25 percent cap on liquidated damages allowed to 
New York employers, unlike many other jurisdictions that allow recovery of 100 percent 
liquidated damages.”). 
 218. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450. 
 219. See Introducer’s Memorandum in Support (June 29, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill 
Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 5–8; Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, 
Counsel to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 10, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, 
ch. 564, at 9–10; Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. 
ANN. 428–31. 
 220. See Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 18 (emphasis added). 
 221. See Letter from Coal. for the Homeless to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 9, 
2011), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 75.  The letter appears misdated as 
2011 because it advocates legislation enacted in 2010. 
 222. See Letter from Jobs with Justice to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 7, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 19. 
 223. See Letter from Make the Road to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 3, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 34. 
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example, although ultimately supporting enactment, the New York County 
Lawyers’ Association complained that the bill’s protections did not go far 
enough.224  As the association explained, “The category of workers to 
whom these remedies are directed are notoriously low paid, and, the 
remedies, even as improved by the proposal, do not approach the potential 
of the remedies of the [FLSA] which allows up to 100% of liquidated 
damages.”225  Likewise, the New York State Bar Association Committee on 
Labor characterized the 25 percent liquidated damages as “minimal,” since 
similar violations of federal law would lead to recovery of “an amount 
equal to the unpaid wages as liquidated damages.”226 
These concerns remained germane for decades.  In 1997, New York 
passed the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act,227 which, inter alia, increased 
criminal penalties under section 198-a.228  For repeat offenders, the act also 
authorized officials to collect a “sum as a civil penalty in an amount equal 
to double the total [wages] found to be due,” while liquidated damages 
remained at 25 percent.229  In a statement of purpose, the legislature 
lamented the continued “[e]xploitation of these most vulnerable workers,” 
especially those in the garment and service industries.230  It asserted, “The 
purpose of this legislation, therefore, is to provide [NYDOL] and working 
people with stronger and more varied tools with which to collect unpaid 
wages.”231  As the governor’s memorandum explained, “Increasing the 
monetary penalties against dishonest employers will help deter wage law 
violations.”232  In 2009, the legislature once again increased penalties but 
not liquidated damages.233 
The 2010 Amendment, however, increased section 198(1-a)’s liquidated 
damages for the first time in nearly forty-five years.234  The WTPA’s bill 
jacket brims with statements about the need to deter and punish wage and 
 
 224. See Letter from N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n to Governor Nelson A Rockefeller (Mar. 
31, 1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 7–9.  The association’s comments 
specifically address section 2 of the bill regarding section 663 of the NYLL, but do not take 
a position on the identical provisions in section 1 of the bill regarding section 198(1-a) of the 
NYLL. See id.; see also supra note 9 (relating N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) to § 663). 
 225. Letter from N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n to Governor Nelson A Rockefeller (Mar. 31, 
1967), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 9. 
 226. Memorandum from N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Labor, reprinted in N.Y. Bill 
Jacket 1967, ch. 310, at 10. 
 227. ch. 605, § 5, 1997 N.Y. Laws 3392.   
 228. See id.  It also amended Section 198(3) but left Section 198(1-a) unaffected. See id. 
§ 4, 1997 N.Y. Laws at 3393. 
 229. See id. § 7, 1997 N.Y. Laws at 3393–94. 
 230. See id. § 1, 1997 N.Y. Laws at 3392–93. 
 231. Id.; see also Letter from Senator Carl L. Marcellino to Michael C. Finnegan, 
Counsel to Governor George E. Pataki (July 8, 1997), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1997, ch. 
605, at 7–8. 
 232. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 1997, ch. 605, 
at 6. 
 233. Act of Aug. 26, 2009, ch. 372, §§ 1–2, 2009 N.Y. Laws 1086, 1086–87; see also 
supra notes 204–07 and accompanying text (discussing the changes of 2009). 
 234. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450. 
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hour violations.235  The bill’s sponsor criticized existing penalties as 
“minimal and offer[ing] little deterrent,” but observed that this systemic 
shortcoming would “change dramatically,” since “[p]enalties for violating 
employee rights would be increased in order to far better protect workers’ 
rights and interests.”236 
Similarly, NYDOL noted that the WTPA contains “numerous provisions 
intended to deter and punish the nonpayment or underpayment of wages to 
employees . . . .  [including] increases [in] penalties . . . ; [and] liquidated 
damages that will be payable to employees under certain circumstances 
from 25 to 100 percent of amounts owed.”237  NYDOL observed that the 
WTPA would benefit underpaid low-wage workers who are deprived of 
income for rent, groceries, heating, and their families’ other basic needs, 
and who must rely on public assistance.238  NYDOL believed the WTPA 
would both “create new deterrents” and help these aggrieved workers “seek 
redress.”239 
NYDOL urged the WTPA’s enactment because the “[c]urrent penalties 
for wage theft are so low that there is a financial incentive to underpay 
workers.”240  As NELP explained, employers had little to lose, because the 
savings realized through underpayments “often outweigh the costs, even for 
those few who are apprehended.”241  NELP called upon the legislature to 
“up[] the ante”242 for wage and hour violations “to better ensure compliance 
and deterrence.”243 
Other interested parties, such as the New York City Council,244 Jobs with 
Justice,245 the Legal Aid Society,246 and Make the Road247 also supported 
enactment, bemoaning the inadequacy of the existing enforcement scheme.  
As the Legal Aid Society stated, “noncompliance with the basic protections 
of New York Labor Law is often the norm, not the exception . . . .  The 
 
 235. See generally N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564. 
 236. Introducer’s Memorandum in Support (June 29, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 
2010, ch. 564, at 8. 
 237. Letter from N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor to Peter Kiernan, Counsel to Governor David 
A. Paterson (Dec. 10, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 9. 
 238. See id. at 10. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 9. 
 241. BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 52.  As NELP explained, “When we talked to 
employers in low-wage industries, we heard over and over the calculus that results in wage 
theft:  If you get caught, you basically just end up paying the wages you would have paid in 
the first place, so what’s to lose?” Bernhardt, supra note 21. 
 242. Letter from Nat’l Emp’t Law Project to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 56–57. 
 243. Bernhardt, supra note 21; see also BERNHARDT, supra note 3, at 52. 
 244. Res. 0245-2010, N.Y.C. Council (2010); Proposed Res. 245-A, N.Y.C. Council 
(2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 42–43. 
 245. See Letter from Jobs with Justice to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 7, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 19. 
 246. See Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 18. 
 247. See Letter from Make the Road to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 3, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 34. 
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WTPA changes the economic incentives that encourage bad-actor 
employers to violate the law. . . .  These new damages provide just that 
leverage.”248 
Finally, Governor David A. Paterson issued a strongly worded statement 
approving the WTPA.  Acknowledging concerns businesses and trade 
associations expressed over the WTPA’s record-keeping and notice 
requirements, he asserted that it was “crucial” to “move forward and carry 
out the statute’s comprehensive and important mandate to protect workers’ 
rights . . . by deterring violations and by ensuring that employers who seek 
to deny those rights are sanctioned.”249 
One of the few cases examining the WTPA’s legislative history seized 
upon such language of deterrence as proof of legislative intent to address 
future violations, not to remedy past ones.  In McLean v. Garage 
Management Corp.,250 Judge Denise L. Cote found “no evidence of 
legislative intent to apply the 100% liquidated damages amendment 
retroactively.”251  Instead, Judge Cote observed that “the Sponsor’s 
Memorandum suggests that the legislature intended to increase the NYLL’s 
liquidated damages penalty to better deter future violations of the state’s 
labor laws.”252 
E.  The NYLL’s New Prejudgment Interest Provision 
The 2010 Amendment inserted into section 198(1-a) an explicit provision 
for “prejudgment interest as required under the civil practice law and rules,” 
in addition to liquidated damages.253  New York’s statutory prejudgment 
interest rate is 9 percent per annum.254  The WTPA’s bill jacket says 
nothing about this interest provision.255  Neither do floor debates about the 
bill.256  The inclusion of such a provision conjures two alternative 
interpretations of section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages.  On one hand, 
NYLL liquidated damages could be punitive in nature and simply 
supplemented by a compensatory prejudgment interest award designed to 
compensate employees for delay.  On the other hand, the liquidated 
 
 248. Letter from Legal Aid Soc’y to Governor David A. Paterson (Dec. 6, 2010), 
reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 17–18; see also Introducer’s Memorandum in 
Support (June 29, 2010), reprinted in N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564, at 8 (“The penalties 
currently in place for employers paying less than minimum wage are minimal and offer little 
deterrent.”). 
 249. Governor’s Approval Memorandum (emphasis added), reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. 
LEGIS. ANN. 431. 
 250. No. 10 Civ. 3950, 2012 WL 1358739 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2012). 
 251. Id. at *9. 
 252. Id. at *10 (emphasis added); see also supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2010, ch. 564, § 7, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1446, 1450. 
 254. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5004 (McKinney 2007). 
 255. See generally N.Y. Bill Jacket 2010, ch. 564. 
 256. See N.Y. State Senate, Record of Proceedings 7508–12 (June 30, 2010) (Bill No. 
8380); N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 22–43 (Nov. 30, 2010) (Bill No. 
11726); N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 330–37 (July 1, 2010) (Bill No. 
10163-B). 
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damages and the prejudgment interest could both be compensatory.  Such a 
reading would not necessarily render either term superfluous.257  In the 
latter scenario, prejudgment interest would guarantee employees a 
minimum level of compensation should an employer establish the good-
faith defense and become excused from paying liquidated damages 
altogether. 
An analogous minimum recovery issue has sparked a split among circuit 
courts interpreting § 216 of the FLSA.  Generally, courts follow Brooklyn 
Savings Bank and prohibit prejudgment interest in § 216 cases where the 
maximum (100 percent) liquidated damages are awarded.258  Controversy 
arises, however, when a court reduces or eliminates liquidated damages 
pursuant to § 260.259  Some circuits, including the Second Circuit, have 
concluded that employers who manage to avoid liquidated damages cannot 
be assessed prejudgment interest on the back pay awards for which they 
remain liable.260  In contrast, the majority of courts have distinguished 
Brooklyn Savings Bank and awarded prejudgment interest when liquidated 
damages are denied.261  Where partial liquidated damages are awarded, 
their relationship to prejudgment interest has been “inadequately 
explained.”262 
Due to its silence, it is unclear whether the state legislature considered or 
sought to avoid a similar quandary. 
III.  WADING THROUGH THE FLOODWATERS:  WHY COURTS SHOULD 
AWARD ONLY ONE SET OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES 
Whether courts should award both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages 
on the same underlying wage should not depend upon efforts to characterize 
each award as “compensatory” or “punitive,” because such an approach 
presumes that a single clear “purpose” or “nature” can be found.  
Unfortunately, both the statutory text and the legislative history of section 
198(1-a) send conflicting signals, suggesting a mixed purpose.  Therefore, 
courts should recognize that the provisions are nearly identical and serve 
the same de facto purposes. 
 
 257. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 98 (McKinney 1971) (“All parts of a statute must be 
harmonized with each other as well as with the general intent of the whole statute, and effect 
and meaning must, if possible, be given to the entire statute and every part and word 
thereof.”); In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (N.Y. 1996). 
 258. 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-166 to -167. 
 259. 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2006); see also 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-164. 
 260. See Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 1953) (agreeing 
with Landaas v. Canister Co., 188 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1951), where the Third Circuit held 
that there is “no in-between position consisting of unpaid wages plus interest.  The claimant 
gets liquidated damages for delay . . . or he gets nothing.”); see also 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, 
at 18-164. But see Kadden v. VisuaLex, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4892, 2012 WL 5199369, at *1–2 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (awarding prejudgment interest although employer’s “good-faith 
defense” avoided § 216(b) liquidated damages). 
 261. See 2 KEARNS, supra note 8, at 18-165 to -166. 
 262. Id. at 18-167; see also id. at 18-167 to -169 (discussing the various approaches to 
prejudgment interest that courts take in partial liquidated damages scenarios). 
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A.  The State Statutory Text Does Not Express an Exclusively 
Compensatory or Punitive Purpose 
The statutory text sheds only a dim light upon legislative intent.  First, 
the state legislature’s characterization of the award as a “liquidated 
damage” indicates a compensatory purpose.  The dictionary definition of 
“liquidated damages” suggests a compensatory function, because such 
damages compensate for losses that are hard to estimate, calculate, or 
prove.263  Nonetheless, the term “liquidated damages” is not always used 
strictly according to its definition.  For example, in Missel, Brooklyn 
Savings Bank, Thurston, Schleier, Reilly, and Carter, courts required 
extrinsic aids, like legislative history, to determine the respective purposes 
of “liquidated damages” provisions.264  Furthermore, other NYLL 
provisions specifically employ the term “penalty” instead of “liquidated 
damages.”265  Such labels, however, do not necessarily govern intent.266 
Second, the lack of a “willfulness” or another scienter requirement 
indicates a compensatory purpose or at least the absence of a punitive one.  
Original interpretations of the 1967 Version as punitive relied upon both the 
willfulness requirement and the statute’s legislative history.267  Of course, 
the state legislature removed section 198(1-a)’s willfulness requirement,268 
and the 1967 Version’s legislative history is much less clear-cut than courts 
have presented it to be.269  While the presence or absence of a willfulness or 
a similar scienter requirement is not necessarily determinative, it is one of 
the chief considerations in analyzing the nature of a statutory liquidated 
damages provision.270  For example, the Supreme Court cited a willfulness 
proviso as distinguishing the ADEA’s otherwise substantially identical 
provision from the FLSA’s.271  Likewise, Carter decided that the 1967 
Version’s liquidated damages served as a “penalty” for class-action 
purposes, because only victims of “willful” violations would receive the 
additional award—others would recover only their unpaid wages.272  Reilly, 
following suit, also emphasized the willfulness requirement.273  Without 
conditioning section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages upon culpability, 
 
 263. For definitions of “liquidated damages,” see supra notes 87–88, 107 and 
accompanying text. 
 264. For discussions of these cases, see supra Parts I.C.2, I.C.3, II.B. 
 265. Compare, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 197, 198-a, 215, 662 (McKinney Supp. 2013), 
with id. § 198(1-a). 
 266. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 268. See supra notes 59, 178–80 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra Parts I.C.3, II.A. 
 270. See supra Parts I.B.4, II.B. 
 271. See Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1995) (citing Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985)); see also supra notes 183–95 and accompanying text. 
 272. See Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980), 
aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981). 
 273. See Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d, 253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding 
section 198(1-a)’s liquidated damages provision is “to deter an employer’s willful 
withholding of wages” (emphasis added)). 
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violations resulting from negligence or even ignorance will trigger 
liquidated damages.274  The inclusion of a good-faith defense does not 
affect this analysis.275  Because of the amendments, the punishment is no 
longer restricted to those who are blameworthy, and the deterrent is no 
longer restricted to those who might consider wrongdoing, so the 
provision’s punitive nature is diminished. 
Finally, the prejudgment interest provision does not require section 
198(1-a)’s liquidated damages to be punitive, because the provision could 
be intended to ensure a minimum compensatory recovery, as previously 
discussed.276 
B.  The State Legislative History Does Not Express an Exclusively 
Compensatory or Punitive Purpose  
Because the text expresses no clear compensatory or punitive purpose, 
courts should turn to extrinsic materials for evidence of legislative intent.277  
Regrettably, like the text, the legislative history provides no clear answer.  
Instead, the legislative history sends conflicting signals.  As illustrated 
above in Part II, and as discussed below, some portions emphasize 
compensating workers and conformity with the FLSA, while others focus 
on deterring and punishing violations. 
First, the 1967 Version’s legislative history contains numerous references 
to compensation.278  Documents in the bill jacket suggest that the 25 
percent liquidated damages the 1967 Version provided to employees were 
intended to be simultaneously compensatory and punitive in nature.279  
Memoranda from the bill’s sponsor, the governor, and the enforcing agency 
all explicitly stated that the liquidated damages would compensate 
employees for the consequences of employers’ violations.280  Their 
unanimous concern over compensation makes sense.  Low-wage workers 
comprise an especially vulnerable demographic, and the impact of withheld 
wages might be so severe and difficult to prove that ordinary prejudgment 
interest would not provide sufficient remuneration for their unique 
injuries.281  As previously discussed, providing an estimated award that 
bypasses the need to prove special damages is exactly what “liquidated 
damages” normally do.282  Indeed, such concerns underlie the FLSA’s 
liquidated damages provision.283 
 
 274. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra Part II.E. 
 277. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing New York statutory construction). 
 278. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 279. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 280. See supra Part II.A. 
 281. See supra notes 22–23, 33, 207, 238 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 87–88, 107. 
 283. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707–08, 715–16 (1945); Overnight 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583–84 (1942); supra Part I.C.2. 
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At the very least, these sources demonstrate that prejudgment interest 
would duplicate a portion, however small, of the 25 percent liquidated 
damages, which, when awarded, were intended to compensate employees 
for the delay in payment.  Further, concluding that the 1967 Version 
contained a compensatory element does not conflict with Carter, because 
Carter did not rule out the possibility.284  The specific question of 
prejudgment interest was not presented in Carter, and Carter did not hold 
that the 1967 Version’s liquidated damages are exclusively punitive.285  The 
Supreme Court has indicated that statutory damages may serve multiple 
purposes.286  Thus, to the extent that the 1967 Version’s legislative history 
supports Reilly’s interpretation of Carter as standing for the proposition that 
the liquidated damages are exclusively “punitive,” such an interpretation can 
only survive in combination with the 1967 Version’s willfulness 
requirement, which no longer exists.287 
Rather, one of the reasons for amending section 198(1-a) was conformity 
with the FLSA.288  Conformity entails bringing the two statutes into 
agreement with one another.  The 2009 Amendment’s legislative history 
shows that interested parties, including the bill’s sponsor, contemplated 
conformity with the FLSA as a goal, not simply a side effect.289  With 
conformity as a goal, it would be unlikely that the drafters intended for 
plaintiffs to receive two sets of liquidated damages.  Otherwise, whether or 
not the state provision “conforms” to its federal counterpart would be 
irrelevant—a plaintiff could recover under both statutes regardless of 
conformity.  If, however, the legislators intended to provide state 
protections as an alternative to those under federal law, then it seems likely 
that they would be very much concerned with having the NYLL “conform” 
to the FLSA, which provides compensatory liquidated damages.290  Indeed, 
by removing the willfulness requirement, the legislature eased the 
employee’s evidentiary burdens.  This change was remedial, not 
prophylactic, because employees find themselves in the courtroom only 
after wage and hour violations have already occurred.291 
It is clear, however, that the 2010 Amendment’s primary purposes were 
deterrence and retribution.  Assorted memoranda supporting the bill, 
including the sponsor’s and the governor’s, consistently expressed such 
 
 284. See Carter v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 115, 116–17 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980), 
aff’d, 419 N.E.2d 1079 (N.Y. 1981). 
 285. See id.; supra Part I.C.3. 
 286. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); see also supra 
notes 197–202 and accompanying text. 
 287. Reilly specifically states that the purpose of the state’s liquidated damages provision 
is “to deter” a “willful withholding” of wages. Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 
253, 265 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 288. See supra Part II.C. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 291. One might argue that the burden shift decreases the likelihood that an employer will 
escape liability for liquidated damages and consequently strengthens deterrence.  The 2009 
Amendment’s legislative history, however, does not support this argument. 
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sentiments.292  The WTPA finally upped the ante after New York spent 
decades under an ineffective enforcement system.293 
Since the 2010 Amendment increased liquidated damages from 25 
percent to 100 percent, it would be reasonable to conclude that the 
difference is punitive.  Dissecting the liquidated damages award, however, 
would still leave the remaining 25 percent undefined and lead to 
complicated calculations, essentially defeating the very utility of a 
“liquidated” award.  Permitting the punitive purposes of the increase to 
overwhelm the mixed purposes of the original award is also 
unacceptable.294 
C.  The Federal and State Liquidated Damages Provisions Overlap 
Neither the statutory text nor the legislative history unambiguously points 
towards either an exclusively compensatory or punitive purpose.  Therefore, 
courts have a couple of options.  First, they could, and should, recognize the 
fact that both compensatory and punitive considerations shaped the state 
legislation.  Upon doing so, they should award only one set of liquidated 
damages to avoid duplicating the portion of state liquidated damages, 
whatever that portion might be, which the legislature deemed appropriate 
compensation for the harms of wage underpayment.  Alternatively, courts 
confronting demands for both FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages on the 
same underlying wage could adopt a practical approach, under which they 
should also award one set of liquidated damages. 
Under the current statutory scheme, it does not matter whether section 
198(1-a)’s liquidated damages are exclusively compensatory, punitive, or 
both.  First, if the NYLL’s liquidated damages are exclusively 
compensatory, the double recovery doctrine obviously would prohibit 
combining them with the FLSA’s liquidated damages.  Similarly, if the 
NYLL’s liquidated damages are both compensatory and punitive, then 
combining them with the FLSA’s liquidated damages would duplicate the 
compensatory aspect of the state award.  Finally, even if the NYLL’s 
liquidated damages are exclusively punitive, the double recovery doctrine 
would still prohibit their combination with the FLSA’s, because the NYLL 
already provides plaintiffs a compensatory remedy for delay in the form of 
prejudgment interest.295  Prejudgment interest is a compensatory award for 
the delayed use of money.296  Thus, awards under both the FLSA and the 
NYLL would overlap, because the FLSA’s liquidated damages are designed 
 
 292. See supra Part II.D. 
 293. See id. 
 294. See N.Y. STAT. LAW § 192 (McKinney 1971) (“An amendatory act and the original 
statute are to be construed together, and the original act and the amendments are viewed as 
one law passed at the same time.”). 
 295. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a) (McKinney Supp. 2013); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
5004 (McKinney 2007). 
 296. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text (discussing the compensatory nature 
of prejudgment interest). 
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to compensate employees for a host of injuries associated with untimely 
payments, including the delayed use of money.297  Employees cannot 
receive duplicative awards for delay.  Accordingly, courts should award 
only NYLL damages, because they provide a greater payout.298 
Dodging the question of “purpose” or “nature” in this manner might 
provide only temporary reprieve, as the legislature could remove the 
NYLL’s prejudgment interest provision.  Further, it would certainly be 
ironic if adding state prejudgment interest to state liquidated damages, for a 
minimum of 109 percent of unpaid wages, prevented the combination of 
FLSA and NYLL liquidated damages, which would amount to 200 percent 
of unpaid wages.  Indeed, 100 percent plus interest will almost always be 
less than the 125 percent combined award, which some courts had awarded 
under the 1967 Version.299 
If determining the purpose or nature of section 198(1-a) remains a 
relevant objective, it is important to remember that, despite all of the saber 
rattling about cracking down on “wage theft,” the 2010 Amendment merely 
put section 198(1-a) on par with its federal counterpart.  Although the 2010 
Amendment took a giant leap forward by quadrupling state liquidated 
damages, employers had already faced the threat of 100 percent liquidated 
damages under the FLSA for over seventy years, and the state’s failure to 
enact stronger provisions illustrates a reluctance to “get tough.”300 
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overlap for a maximum of three years due to the applicable limitations periods). 
 300. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2006), with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a); see also supra 
Part I.A.1 (discussing the FLSA’s enactment in 1938).  A number of other states award 200 
percent liquidated damages. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-355 (2012) (“[T]he 
employee may recover in a civil action against an employer or former employer an amount 
that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages.”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150 
(LexisNexis 2008) (authorizing “treble damages, as liquidated damages, for any lost wages 
and other benefits”).  New York’s legislature considered but did not adopt a similar 
provision.  In July 2010, the New York State Assembly passed a 200 percent liquidated 
damages provision in its version of the WTPA. See Assemb. B. 10163-B, § 8, 233d Sess. 
(N.Y. 2010).  Subsequently, however, the Assembly abandoned that provision in favor of a 
100 percent liquidated damages provision when it adopted the New York State Senate’s 
version of the WTPA instead. See Assemb. B. 11726, § 7, 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2010) (same as 
S.B. 8380, 233d Sess. (N.Y. 2010)); see also N.Y. State Assembly, Record of Proceedings 
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Since the state legislature was aware of the existing federal scheme, 
another relevant question is whether it intended to provide an additional or 
alternative award.  Through the NYLL, the state legislature has constructed 
a comprehensive statutory scheme that both compensates victims when 
wage underpayment occurs and punishes and deters violators.301  In 
addition to liquidated damages, its myriad other mechanisms for 
punishment and deterrence include the specter of large civil penalties, 
criminal fines, and even imprisonment.302  Liquidated damages differ 
because they impact employees’ pockets, not the state’s.  Therefore, like the 
FLSA, the NYLL incentivizes private enforcement, saving the government 
money.303 
The parallels between the state and federal schemes support the 
conclusion that the NYLL’s liquidated damages are an alternative to the 
FLSA’s.  As a deterrent, section 198(1-a)’s provisions are no more 
persuasive than the FLSA’s, and as a punishment, they are no more 
painful.304  Both statutes address the same harm, provide employees the 
same remedy, and grant employers essentially the same defense.305  
Without compelling contrary evidence, awarding liquidated damages under 
both statutes on the same underlying wage constitutes a double recovery 
that courts should avoid. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts facing demands for liquidated damages under both the FLSA and 
the NYLL should not award them under both statutes.  In light of the 
conflicting textual and historical evidence, a dichotomous approach or a 
“judgment call” choosing one purpose over the other would disregard the 
fact that both compensatory and punitive considerations shaped the state 
legislation.  NYLL liquidated damages should be recognized for what they 
are—both compensatory and punitive in nature.  Consequently, courts can 
only avoid double recovery by awarding liquidated damages under one 
statute. 
 
23–24 (Nov. 30, 2010) (Bill No. 11726) (remarks of Assemb. Carl E. Heastie) (explaining 
that the Senate’s version provided lower liquidated damages than Assembly’s version). 
 301. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. LEGIS. ANN. 
431 (describing the WTPA as “comprehensive and expansive”); Gottlieb v. Kenneth D. Laub 
& Co., 626 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1993) (observing that the 1967 Version provides 
“cumulative remedies for wage claims brought thereunder”).  
 302. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 197, 198, 198-a, 215, 662, 663. 
 303. See supra notes 93, 103 and accompanying text. 
 304. New York’s prohibition of class recovery further dulls the pain of § 198(1-a)’s 
liquidated damages. See Governor’s Approval Memorandum, reprinted in 2010 N.Y. ST. 
LEGIS. ANN. 428–31 (explaining that provisions that would have removed N.Y. C.P.L.R 
901(b)’s prohibition on class recovery were removed from the WTPA); see also supra note 
98 and accompanying text (briefly discussing N.Y. C.P.L.R 901(b)).  On the other hand, 
New York has a longer statute of limitations than the FLSA does. See supra notes 64–65 and 
accompanying text. 
 305. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 260, with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 198(1-a). 
